U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women by Ernst, Julia
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law 
Volume 3 Issue 1 
1996 
U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women 
Julia Ernst 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Gender 
Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl/vol3/iss1/8 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Gender & Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON




I. SUMMARY OF THE TERMS OF CEAFDAW. 302
II. GENERAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RATIFICATION
BY THE UNITED STATES • 308
A. History of Ratification Procedures. 308
B. The Slow Pace of Ratification . 311
C. Complete Prior Compliance with the
Terms of the Convention • 313
D. Fear of the Encroachment of International
Law upon Domestic Law. 315
E. The Preservation of Federalism . 319
F. Civil and Political Rights v. Economic,
Socia and Cultural Rights. 322
III. CONCERNS REGARDING SPECIFIC CONVENTION
PROVISIONS • 324
IV. PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION - 335
A. The Legal Effect of the Convention
under International Law. 335
B. The Impact of Reservations . 337
C. Lack of an Enforcement Mechanism. 340
D. The Lack of a Provision Addressing
Violence against Women - 343
E. CEDAW's Need for a Complaint and
Communication Process. 345
F. CEDAWs Need for Increased Time
and Resources and Special Rapporteurs . 346
G. The Bifurcation of Women's Rights
from Other Human Rights. 348
Julia Ernst (J.D. 1994, University of Michigan Law School; MA. 1994 (World
Politics), University of Michigan Political Science Department) is an environmental
attorney at Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman in Detroit, Michi-
gan. She received a Bates scholarship to attend the NGO Forum of the United
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in China.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
V. Ti IMPORTANCE OF RATIFICATION BY THE
UNITED STATES •355
A. Increased Credibility and Influence
of US. Foreign Policy. 355
B. Opportunity to Influence the Development
of International Human Rights Law and to
Designate a U.S. Nominee to CEDAW. 357
C. Recognition of Women's Rights as Human Rights
and the Need for Greater International
Promotion of Women's Equality. 359
D. Continuity of U.S. Support for the
International Equality of Women. 361
E. The Inspiration of Other Progressive
U.S. Measures. 362
F. Grassroots Supportfor Ratification. 364
CONCLUSION •366
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding recent social, legal, and economic advances in the
status of women in many countries, invidious gender discrimination is
still pervasive throughout the world.' In consequence, women worldwide
continue to suffer extensive hardship. Some aspects of gender discrimina-
tion are common to women in all parts of the world, whereas other
forms are specific to particular regions or countries.2 In addition,
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dcrimination against Women: Hearing
Befbre the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearing 4] (statement of U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi).
2. ESCHEL M. RHOODIE, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF THE
ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND POLTcAL STATUS OF WOMEN, 30 (1989);
JEANNE VICKERaS, WOMEN AND WAR 27 (1993); JANICE WOOD WETzE., THE
WORLD OF WOMEN 88 (1993). See also International Human Rights Abuses against
Women: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 107 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing2]; Christine Chinkin, Remarks, in
Resolving Conflicting Human Rights Standards in International Law, 85 Am. Soc'Y
INTL L PRoc. 336, 352 (1991); Dusko Doder, The Old Sexsm in New China, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 24, 1989, at 37; Europe's Women-How the Other
Half Works, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 1990, at 21; Jo FISHER, OUT OF THE
SHADOWS: WOMEN, RESISTANCE AND PoLrTcs IN SOUTH AMERICA 3 (1993);
BARBARA J. NELSON, NAJMA CHOWDHURY, WOMEN AND POLITICS WORLDWIDE 15
(1994); OURS By RIGHI. WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (JoAnna Kerr ed.,
1993); Hideko Takayama, The Main Track at Last, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1990, at
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although women in the United States have made great advances toward
gender equality, various forms of gender-based discrimination stubbornly
persist in this nation as well.3
The United Nations General Assembly recognized and condemned
the devastating consequences of gender discrimination for women when
it unanimously adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women4 (CEAFDAW) in 1979.
CEAFDAW went into effect in 1981, and by 1995 139 U.N. Member
States had ratified the Convention, pledging to actively promote the
equality of women and men in all areas of life and to end both dejure
and defacto discrimination against women.5 Unfortunately, the United
States has yet to ratify the Convention.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the need for ratification
of the Convention by the United States, and to address arguments
against ratification. Various concerns have been raised with respect to
CEAFDAW, both specific to the United States and more international
in scope. Some problems pertain to United States ratification generally,
51; KATmNA TomtsmEvsm, WoMEN AND HuMAN RIGHTS 10 (1993); WOMEN IN
THE FACE OF CHANGE: THE SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE AND CHINA 14 (Shirin
Rai, Hilary Pikington & Annie Phizacldea eds., 1992); WOMEN AND SocF IN
RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 188 (Linda Edmondson ed., 1992).
3. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs OF DIscIM mnoN AGAINST
WomEN, Exec. Rept. 103-38, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1994) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT]; Violence against Women: Victims of the System, Hearing befbre Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1991); THE AMERIcAN
WoMAN i988-989: A STATUS REPORT 95 (Sara E. Rix ed., 1988); Ramona L.
Paetzold and Anne M. O'Leary Kelly, Organizational Communication and the Legal
Dimensions ofHostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT
COMMUNICATION IMPLICATIONS, 63 (Gary L. Kreps ed., 1993); MYRA AND DAVID
SADKER, FAILING AT FRNESS: How AMERiCAs SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRs, 111 (1994);
Hal Witteman, The Inteiface Between Sexual Harassment and Organizational Romance,
in SmcUAL HARAsSMENT COMMUNICATION IMPLICATIONS, 27.
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Sept. 3, 1981, G.A.Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (1980), 19 I.L.M. 33
[hereinafter CEAFDAW]. The Convention has elsewhere been referred to as
"CEDAW." However, this article uses the full acronym "CEAFDAW" to refer to the
Convention, in order to avoid confusion with the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, also known as "CEDAW."
5. National Committee on U.N./CEDAW, The United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Fact Sheet, September
1995 [hereinafter, Fact Sheet]. See also Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of
Discrimination Against Womem Hearing Before the Senate Comm on Foreign Relations,
103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing 3] (statement of Jamison S.
Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State).
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other issues concern potential conflicts between specific articles of the
Convention and U.S. law, and broader problems have been raised with
respect to international implementation. Most of these issues are not
uncommon in international agreements, and may therefore be remedied
through conventional mechanisms, including implementing legislation,
reservations, clarifying statements, participation in the monitoring body
created by the Convention, and active involvement within the United
Nations system and other international organizations involved in the
creation of international laws and principles.
The first section of this article summarizes the terms of the Con-
vention. The second section, considers general difficulties with ratifica-
tion of the Convention by the United States. The third section addresses
concerns regarding specific provisions of CEAFDAW. The fourth section
discusses more universal concerns about the Convention. In light of the
serious global problem of gender discrimination, CEAFDAW's interna-
tional guarantee of remedies to eradicate such discrimination, and the
surmountability of CEAFDAW's shortcomings, the final section argues
in favor of ratification by the United States.
I. SUMMARY OF THE TERMS OF CEAFDAW
CEAFDAW's declared purpose, as stated in its preamble, is to
eliminate gender discrimination for the following reasons:
[D]iscrimination against women violates the principles of
equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle
to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in
the political, social, economic and cultural life of their coun-
tries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the
family and makes more difficult the full development of the
potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of
humanity.
6
The body of the Convention consists of sixteen substantive articles
specifying areas of particular national governmental focus to eliminate
gender discrimination, and contains provisions establishing a committee
to monitor progress within signatory States and providing for dispute
resolution and reporting requirements.
6. CEAFDAW, supra note 4. See also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT VIENNA, CENTRE
FOR SOCIL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN APAIRS, COMPENDIUM OF INTER-




Discrimination against women is defined in Article 1 as any
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex,
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women,
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.
States Parties to the Convention condemn discrimination against
women in Article 2, which enumerates ways in which Parties will
undertake to eliminate gender discrimination through "all appropriate
means and without delay."' These means include ensuring the principle
of gender equality within the national constitution and legislation;
adopting laws prohibiting discrimination against women; establishing
public institutions to protect women against discrimination; ensuring
that public agencies refrain from gender discrimination; mandating that
discrimination by enterprises, organizations, and persons is eliminated;
and abolishing laws, regulations, customs and practices perpetuating
gender discrimination.
Article 3 embodies a progressive movement toward equality, requir-
ing States Parties "to take, in the political, social, economic and cultural
fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guarantee-
ing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms on the basis of equality with men."9
Temporary affirmative action measures, which must be terminated
when gender equality is attained, are permitted under Article 4.1" Mea-
sures providing special or different treatment for the protection of
maternity are deemed to be nondiscriminatory under the Convention.
1"
Article 5 emphasizes that socially and culturally recognized gender
roles are both harmful and prejudicial, and reinforce the stereotypical
perception of inferiority or superiority between women and men, albeit
couched in value-neutral terms. 2 This Article also provides for adequate
7. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 1.
8. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 2.
9. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 3.
10. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 4.
11. CEAFDAW. supra note 4, Artide 4.
12. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artide 5.
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family education which recognizes the social importance of maternity,
the shared responsibilities of both parents in raising children, and the
primacy of the interests of children within the family.
States Parties agree in Article 6 to work actively to eliminate the
exploitation of women through prostitution and all other forms of
trafficking in women.'3
Article 7 accords to women the right to participate equally in
domestic politics."4
Similarly, Article 8 grants women the right of full participation in
international organizations, and to participate and represent their re-
spective countries in such bodies.
15
Article 9 provides for equal rights for women to change or retain
their own nationality, particularly when marrying a husband of different
nationality or when a husband changes his nationality, and permits
women to confer their own nationality upon their children on a parity
with men.
16
Article 10 provides for equal rights to education for women.
17
Coeducation is encouraged but not required by CEAFDAW. s
Article 11 discusses employment, and gives women free choice with
respect to their training, employment, and career, and ensures equality
between women and men of pay, benefits, promotion, job security,
social security, occupational safety, health protection, and vocational
training."' This Article also prohibits employment termination on
grounds of marital status or pregnancy, provides for maternity leave,
recommends the establishment of social services such as child care, and
encourages protection during pregnancy from harmful work.
Article 12 requires equal access for both women and men to health
care, and provides for family planning services and adequate health care
during pregnancy."
Article 13 ensures nondiscrimination against women in both social
and economic life.2' Induded are equal access to family benefits,
13. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 6.
14. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 7.
15. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 8.
16. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 9.
17. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 10.
18. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 10.
19. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 11.
20. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 12.
21. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 13.
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financial credit such as mortgages and bank loans, and cultural life,
including sports and recreational activities.'
Article 14 recognizes the particularly intransigent problems peculiar
to women in rural societies, the value of their unremunerated labor, and
their right to equal benefits from and participation in programs of rural
planning and development.3
Article 15 provides for equal legal capacities between men and
women and equal treatment in the legal system.
24
Article 16 requires equality between women and men with respect
to both the economic and parental aspects of marriage and family.25 The
Article also acknowledges the important contributions that women make
to the well-being of families.
Articles 17 through 22 provide for the establishment of a Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).26
Ratifying countries agree, under the terms of the Convention, to report
to the Committee within one year of ratification and every four years
thereafter concerning progress in their efforts to implement the provi-
sions of the Convention, including administrative, judicial, legislative,
and other measures. The Committee is structured to comprise an expert
body of twenty-three members from a broad geographical distribution of
countries party to the Convention. It normally meets for two weeks
annually, and it reports and may make recommendations to the General
Assembly annually through the Economic and Social Commission
(ECOSOC).
27
Articles 23 through 30 contain general clarifying and procedural
clauses. Article 23 provides that "[n]othing in this Convention shall
affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achievement of
equality between men and women which may be contained... [i]n the
legislation of a State Party; or [i]n any other international convention,
treaty or agreement in force for that State."2" It becomes the duty of
States Parties, under Article 24, to adopt "all necessary measures at the
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights
22. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artide 13.
23. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artide 14.
24. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artilde 15.
25. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 16.
26. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Articles 17-22.
27. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artildes 17-22.
28. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 23.
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recognized in the present Convention."29 Article 28 prohibits any
reservations that are inconsistent or incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention."0 Article 29 allows States Parties to submit
disputes regarding interpretation or application of the Convention to
arbitration and to the International Court of Justice.
3 1
The swift ratification of CEAFDAW by a great number of nations
reflects its significance, both domestically and internationally.32 It has
become the fundamental legal basis for the de jure recognition of
women's rights in many countries. Through ratification, States Parties
undertake the obligation to guarantee equally for women and men the
rights enumerated in the Convention. Numerous States Parties have
adopted legislation and other measures to abolish gender discrimination
and to comply with the goals and objectives of the Convention.
33
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women provides for the creation of an international body to
monitor its implementation: the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).' As noted above, CEDAW
consists of twenty-three persons having expertise in matters concerning
29. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 24.
30. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 28.
31. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 29.
32. As of 1995, the following nations had ratified the Convention: Albania, Angola,
Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, The Bahamas, Bangla-
desh, Barbados, Belarus Republic, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
& Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Central Aftican Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicara-
gua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Moldava,
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad
& Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukranian Republic, United Kingdom of Great
Britain & Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet
Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
33. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 3.
34. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 17.
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the status of women.35 Its purpose is to promote implementation of
CEAFDAW and cooperation among States Parties through the mutual
exchange of information and experience." The Convention establishes a
mandatory reporting procedure, which requires States Parties to submit
periodic reports on the status of women and the implementation of the
Convention to CEDAW every four years.-7 The Committee's power lies
in its ability to consider the reports, examine how the reporting States
are implementing their obligations under the Convention, and subject
the reporting government to international scrutiny.38 However, it is
without power to make decisions which are binding on States Parties. 9
The Committee also reports its deliberations to the Economic and Social
Council and the General Assembly, and makes suggestions and general
recommendations based upon the State reports to these bodies in order
to assist States Parties in monitoring their progress and to indicate
CEDAW's interpretation of Convention provisions.40 Particular aspects
35. See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TAVAUX PREPARAToRIES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELUMINATION OF ALl FORMS OF DIscRiMINATION
AGAINsT WOMEN 353 (1993) (noting that the membership of the Committee
through 1994 consisted of experts from the following countries: Ghana, Japan,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ecuador, Spain, New Zealand, Italy, Barbados, Venezuela, Argen-
tina, Yugoslavia, Bangladesh, Finland, Colombia, Russian Federation, Burkina Faso,
Philippines, Germany, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Nigeria).
36. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 3, 22.
37. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 3, 18.
38. See HiLIA PiETILX & JEANNE VIcKERs, MAING WOMEN MATrER: THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 100 (1990).
39. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 3.
40. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 18.
These recommendations concern the information to be provided in their
periodic reports, the adoption of education and public information
programmes to help eliminate prejudices and current practices that hinder
the full operation of the principle of social equality of women, and reser-
vations that appeared to be incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention... the use of temporary special measures under artide 4
of the Convention, the establishment or strengthening of national ma-
chineries to ensure the effective elimination of discrimination against
women, publicity of the Convention and the Committee's work, and
women's equal opportunity to represent their Governments at the interna-
tional level and to participate in the work of international organizations.
Id See also John Gibson, International Human Rights Law: Progression of Sources,
Agencies, and Law, 14 SUFFOLx TRANSNAT'L UJ. 41, 56-57 (1990). According to
Gibson, the General Assembly, upon reviewing CEDAW's report,
expresses appreciation; takes note of the extensive proceedings and treaty
body recommendations for improvement of the entire reporting, monitor-
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of the Committee and its functions will be discussed in subsequent
sections of this article.
II. GENERAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RATIFICATION
BY THE UNITED STATES
Obstacles to ratification by the United States include those inherent
to ratification of any international human rights document and those
specific to CEAFDAW. Discussion of the former most appropriately
begins with a review of the Convention's ratification procedures that
have occurred thus far in the United States. Endemic obstacles to
ratification of any international treaty, and particularly those addressing
human rights, include the deliberate pace of the ratification process
itself; the desire to be in full compliance with conventions prior to
ratification; an apprehension of encroachment of international law into
domestic law; the preservation of the federalist system of governance; the
nonrecognition of economic, social, and cultural rights; and a provincial
distaste for international scrutiny of domestic politics and conditions of
life.
A. History of Ratification Procedures
The United Nations General Assembly adopted CEAFDAW in
Resolution 34/180 on December 18, 1979.41 The Convention entered
into force on September 3, 1981, as an international treaty, upon
ratification by the twentieth member nation. 2 On July 17, 1980, the
Carter Administration signed the Convention. In October, Secretary of
State Edmund Muskie sent a letter of submittal to President Carter
ing and response procedures; commends state parties for submitting their
reports and honoring their commitments under [CEAFDAW]; and urges
states to comply with those commitments and cooperate closely with the
treaty bodtyl.
Id
41. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 17. The Secretary-General presented the Convention
to the 1980 World Conference in Copenhagen, where flfty-two States signed and
two States ratified the document as a part of the Signing Ceremony. REHOF, supra
note 35, at 11. The Conference then "called on all States to sign and ratify the
Convention, to take all necessary measures for its implementation and to publicize
it, and asked specialized agencies and NGOs to take part in national and interna-
tional publicity activities." REHOP, supra note 35, at 11.
42. COMPENDUM, supra note 6, at 17.
[Vol. 3:299
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supporting ratification of CEAFDAW, and indicating the "enthusiastic"
support of the Convention by the Departments of Justice, Health and
Human Services, Education, Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and the United States Commission on Civil Rights.43 In
his message to the Senate upon transmitting the Convention on Novem-
ber 12, 1980, President Carter noted that most of the Convention's
substantive provisions are consistent with the U.S. Constitution and
laws. He also noted that although
certain provisions of the Convention raise questions of confor-
mity to current United States law ... the Departments of
State and Justice and other interested agencies of the Federal
Government concur in the judgement that, with the adoption
of certain qualifications and, possibly, appropriate implement-
ing legislation, there are no constitutional or other legal obsta-
cles to United States ratification.
44
When the Carter Administration transmitted the Convention to the
Senate, it noted that legislation or specific reservations may be necessary
to bring the United States into full compliance prior to ratification. The
Administration drew attention to possible conflicts between almost half
of the Convention's substantive articles and United States law,
specifically articles 2, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 14.45 The transmittal noted
several potential problem areas, including those concerning the feder-
al/state division of powers; the Convention's mandate to eliminate gender
discrimination in health care, service benefits, public accommodation,
and possibly the military and the draft; and matters concerning compara-
ble worth.46 Regrettably, the Carter Administration did not recommend
any specific declarations, understandings, or reservations which would
eliminate such conflicts and enable immediate ratification.47
43. EDMUND S. MusIE, LETrER OF SUBMrTTA, OCTOBER 23, 1980, S. ExEc. R., 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
44. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STAS TRANSMITTING THE CON-
VENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOM-
EN, ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DECEMBER 18, 1979,
AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON JULY 17, 198o, S.
ExEc. R., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter Messagefrom the President].
45. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
46. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Senator Paul Simon).
47. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
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Until 1988, the Senate took no action concerning CEAFDAW,
ostensibly because the Reagan and Bush Administrations had the con-
vention "under review. '  This "review" did not consist of a detailed
analysis of the text of the treaty and its consistency with U.S. laws, but
merely considered whether to support and move forward with the
Convention.49 Without the support of the President, treaties have little
likelihood of being approved by the Senate, and even if the Senate gave
its advice and consent, a treaty would not be effective without formal
ratification by the President.
50
In 1988, the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and Interna-
tional Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Senate held a field hearing in Massachusetts on issues relating to
CEAFDAW.5' By 1990, the Department of Justice had completed a
preliminary review of the Convention to determine possible discrepancies
between U.S. law and CEAFDAW.52 In March and July of that year, the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives held
two hearings on "International Human Rights Abuses Against Women,"
where the need for U.S. ratification of the CEAFDAW was extensively
discussed." In August of 1990, the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the U.S. Senate held a hearing addressing United States ratification of
the Convention.
54
The Clinton Administration has taken a more active role in seeking
the passage of the Convention. This may, in part, be due to congressio-
nal pressure, as in the spring of 1993 sixty-eight Senators sent a letter to
President Clinton requesting that he take appropriate measures to ratify
CEAFDAW.55 During the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights,
48. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Senator Claiborne Pell).
49. See Hearing i, supra note 1, at 57, 62 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal
Advisor, Department of State). See also, Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of
Senator Claiborne Pell); Catherine E. Bocksor, Whos Afraid of the Women's Conven-
tion?, LA DAILY J., October 2, 1990.
50. Hearing i, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Senator Claiborne Pell).
51. Issues Relating to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: Hearing Bere the Subcom. on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988).
52. Hearing i, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
53. Hearing 2, supra note 2.
54. Hearingx, supra note 1.
55. B'Nti B'RrrH WOMEN, CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs OF
DiscRIMmNATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW). Sixty-seven Senate votes are required
for consent to ratification of a treaty. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, d. 2.
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Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the Administration
would ask the Senate to ratify CEAFDAW, along with the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,5 6 the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights,57 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 5" Due to this renewed congres-
sional and administrative interest, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations held yet another hearing addressing U.S. ratification of
CEAFDAW on September 27, 1994.59 The Committee subsequently
reported in favor of U.S. ratification of CEAFDAW to the Senate,
approving four reservations, three understandings, and two declarations
to be submitted simultaneously with ratification of the Convention.
60
Although it was placed on the calendar for a vote by the full Senate,
ratification of the Convention was stalled until the session ended.6' Since
no action was taken on the Convention, it will return to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, which must again report on it to the
Senate as a whole. If too much time lapses before such report is made,
new hearings will have to be held.
B. The Slow Pace of Ratification
This history demonstrates one of the obstacles to ratification of
CEAFDAW: the slow pace at which the Department of State reviews
each treaty that has been signed and is under consideration by the
United States. For instance, the Genocide Convention,62 addressing what
should be an uncontroversial issue, took the United States approximately
56. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
57. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.J. Official Records, O.EA/
Ser.KIXVII1.1 Doc. 65 Rev. 1 Corr. 1 (1970) reprinted in L.M. 101.
58. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3. See James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary
Linkage, 27 U.C. DAvis L REv. 793, 836-37 (1994).
59. Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 1.
60. Report on the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1-3
(1994) [hereinafter State Department Report].
61. Convention on the Elimination ofAUl Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, Dispatch
(U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), Jan. 2, 1995, at 6.
62. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, GA. Res.
260A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 174 (1948).
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
forty years to ratify.63 As of 1992, over forty international human rights
treaties were pending in the Senate.' Various reasons have been cited to
explain the extreme lethargy within the administrative bureaucracy when
dealing with international conventions.
One reason for the slow pace of ratification is the historical, yet
largely obsolete, congressional mistrust of and hostility toward interna-
tional treaties, particularly those concerning human rights issues."
Another reason for the slow pace of ratification is the tradition within
the State Department of considering and reviewing each convention
dealing with human rights issues consecutively. All other proposed
conventions are put on hold until the one chosen for immediate action
has been completely reviewed and processed through the ratification
system." As State Department Deputy Legal Advisor Alan Kreczko
testified to the Senate, "there is a perception that by sending up four
treaties at the same time, which is the tactic that President Carter chose
in 1978, and asking to have all of them considered at the same time, any
flaw identified in any convention then became associated with each of
the conventions."67 Moreover, the State Department has limited resourc-
es.6" The Department has asserted that if it attempted to review and
make recommendations to the Senate on all pending treaties simul-
taneously, it would take much longer to have any one convention ready
for consideration by the Senate.
69
Kreczko has also noted that "there has been a certain antipathy in
the Senate to human rights conventions as a method of affecting domes-
63. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 144 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
64. William D. Auman, International Human Rights Law: A Development Overview and
Domestic Application within the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1,
2 (1992).
65. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42
DEPAuL L REv. 1183, 1184-85 (1993).
66. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 144 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
67. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
68. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 144 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).




tic law."7' Therefore, the State Department often attempts to work on
conventions that appear to have the least opposition in the Senate, and
the fewest conflicts with the current U.S. legal system. Despite these
impediments to ratification, to demonstrate a sincere commitment to the
international protection of human rights the United States must devote
adequate resources to the review of human rights treaties and ensure their
swift acceptance and implementation.
C. Complete Prior Compliance with the
Terms of the Convention
Another factor contributing to the delay of U.S. ratification of
CEAFDAW is the desire of the United States to abide fully by the terms
of any treaty to which it is a party.7' Although the Convention merely
requires that the States Parties agree to actively work toward progress in
implementing the terms of the treaty within their country, the State
Department would like to see ratification of the Convention only when
the U.S. can claim to be in conformance with the treaty, either through
actual compliance or through the use of reservations.
72
The United States government may choose to make reservations to
all provisions conflicting with current law, and then if the government
eventually comes into compliance with a reserved provision, it could at
that time withdraw the reservation. A potential problem could arise if the
U.S. finds it necessary to make too many reservations and declarations,
exempting it from a significant number of the substantive portions of the
treaty. Kreczko has stated that a large number of reservations may signify
"a lack of commitment on the issue, rather than a commitment to the
issue. A decision might be made not to go forward on that basis."73
Therefore, if the U.S. government ultimately determines the need to
make a substantial number of reservations, the State Department has
expressed the possibility of not ratifying the Convention at all.
According to some commentators, the approach requiring complete
prior compliance, particularly through reservations, subverts the inherent
70. Heaing r, supra note 1, at 54.
71. Heaing 2, supra note 2, at 144 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
72. See generally Hearingi, supra note 1, at 56 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal
Advisor, Department of State).
73. Hearing i, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
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purpose of the Convention, which is to encourage progress and future
action toward the elimination of discrimination against women.74 If a
State no longer needs to do anything upon ratification to improve the
status of women, the purpose of the Convention will have been defeated,
or at best become moot. Catherine E. Bocskor, Vice Chair of the
American Bar Association's Section on International Law and Practice,
has noted that
[t]he Women's Convention, as an international human rights
convention, does allow for a degree of progressive implemen-
tation by the ratifying countries. This means that it is not
necessary for a country's laws to be in full, complete compli-
ance with the terms of the convention at the time of ratifica-
ton. The international committee that oversees implementation
of this convention in the United Nations does allow for a
country to show progress in fulfilling the terms of the con-
vention. And, of course, a ratifying country can always submit
a reservation with respect to its laws.7
Considering the progressive nature of the Convention, the United
States cannot justify its failure to ratify it with the excuse that U.S. laws
are not in complete accord with the Convention's terms, nor should the
U.S. feel that it must make reservations to every provision with which
it may not be in full compliance. Instead, the United States should ratify
CEAFDAW with as few reservations as possible, and should pass imple-
menting legislation to bring U.S. laws into compliance with the Conven-
tion's prohibition of discrimination against women.76
74. Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 77 (letter from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
This letter noted that the principle
that the United States will undertake to do only what it is already doing
... is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The purpose
of treaties generally is to undertake new obligations or to make a commit-
ment to the international community to adhere to existing obligations. The
mere fact that a treaty establishes standards to which the U.S. does not
currently adhere is not a sufficient reason for a reservation.
Id
75. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 68 (statement of Catherine E. Bocskor, Vice Chair,
Section on International Law and Practice, American Bar Association).
76. The American Bar Association in its report on CEAFDAW suggested that the United
States only submit reservations with respect to the U.S. federal system of government:
"It is important that the United States reservations to the Convention be limited to
the areas of lack of Federal jurisdiction with state and local governments. Implement-
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Other commentators have expressed a related concern that the
Convention's provisions and requirements may be insufficiently clear,
making U.S. obligations and compliance uncertain.' Part of this concern
stems from the fact that, if the United States ratified the Convention, it
would have to report to CEDAW, which would inquire about U.S.
implementation and compliance with the terms of the Convention.
Various interpretations could be made with respect to several of the
Articles, some of which might suggest that the United States would not
be in compliance with the terms of the Convention. The suggestion of
noncompliance would be an international embarrassment to the United
States.7 However, the U.S. could explain its interpretation of the
provision at issue to the Committee, along with its opinion as to why it
is in conformance with the Convention. Moreover, the United States
could submit clarifications explaining its interpretation of the
CEAFDAW's provisions when it ratifies the Convention to prevent such
conflicts of interpretation.
D. Fear of the Encroachment of International
Law upon Domestic Law
The Convention establishes internationally recognized human rights
standards for the achievement of full equality between women and
men.79 Some commentators have expressed concern that CEAFDAW
would change domestic law upon ratification, and object on principle to
this form of creating law within the United States.'0 However, since the
U.S. would most likely include a declaration that the treaty is not self-
executing along with its ratification, the terms of the Convention would
not automatically become a part of the domestic law of the U.S., nor
would they be enforceable in any U.S. court of law by an individual.8 '
ing legislation should be recommended in those areas where United States law does
not conform with the Articles of the Convention." Mark R. Joelson, 1984 A.BA.
Spc. INT'L L. & PRAC. 7.
77. See Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 95 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara
Vucanovich).
78. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
79. See Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 190 (statement entitled Written Testimony).
80. See, e.g., Hearing r, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara
Vucanovich).
81. SENATE REpoRT, supra note 3, at 7-8. A declaration of non-self-execution has been
proposed by the Clinton Administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
as a condition of ratification of CEAFDAW. The declaration states: "Thi United
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In order for the Convention to have effect, Congress would have to
enact implementing legislation. 2 A declaration that the Convention is
non-self-executing would not modify or limit the international obliga-
tions of the United States under CEAFDAW, but would signify that the
Convention does not create individual, private rights enforceable in U.S.
courts.
83
Still others have expressed concern that ratification of CEAFDAW
would require dramatic changes in United States constitutional law,
creating tremendous upheaval of state and federal legislation. 4 This
argument posits that the United States should not ratify the Convention
because the instrument is too invasive, and because the amount of
States declares that, for the purposes of its domestic law, the provisions of the
Convention are non self-executing." See Hearing3, supra note 5, at 50. See also Anne
Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States Courts:
A Comparative Perspective, 14 MiCH. J. IlN'L L. 1, 42 (1992) (noting that similar
declarations were included upon U.S. ratification of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights). For arguments against the use of non-self-executing
declarations, see Sarah C. Zearfoss, Note, The Convention fr the Elimination ofAll
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: RadicaZ Reasonable, or Reactionary?, 12
MICH. J. IN'L L. 903, 931-35 (1991).
82. See Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 81, at 43.
83. Stewart, supra note 65, at 1202-03. See aso Ann Fagan Ginger, The Energizing Effict
of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty, 42 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 1341, 1355 (1993):
[The U.S. government and its people are not free to violate the terms of
a treaty that has been signed by the president and consented to by the
Senate merely because the Senate or the Supreme Court announce that the
treaty, or some part of the treaty, is not "self-executing" and cannot be
enforced in court until the House and Senate pass legislation to execute it.
For arguments opposing this declaration, see Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 50-51
(statement of GayJ. McDougall, Executive Director, Internation Human Rights Law
Group) and Hearing3, supra note 5, at 69 (statement of Kenneth Roth, Executive
Director, Human Rights Watch).
84. Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Bruce Fein, Attorney and Syndicated
Columnist). Fein testified that
[riatification of the convention by the Senate would oblige the Nation
under international law to engineer radical, legal innovations. At present,
the Constitution condemns distinctions by government based upon gender
unless substantially related to furthering an important goal.... The
convention would require amending the Constitution both to reach the
private sector and to prohibit gender distinctions that are noninvidious, but




governmental action that the Convention may be interpreted to mandate
is too demanding.8 5 Jamison S. Borek, current Deputy Legal Advisor of
the Department of State, addressed this argument in her statements to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
In the past, some characterized the Convention as a vehicle for
radical social engineering and legal innovation which would
somehow impinge upon the "timeless legal and moral values"
on which our nation was founded. This is not at all the case.
The Convention is consistent with firmly rooted principles of
equal treatment and opportunity which are already part of our
heritage and tradition. As our legal analysis makes abundantly
clear, for the most part our law is already in compliance. 6
Moreover, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states
in its report on the Convention that "no new implementing legislation
is necessary for the United States to assume obligations under the
Convention." 7 The Clinton Administration and the Foreign Relations
Committee have also suggested reservations to certain provisions that
may conflict with current domestic law, and declarations clarifying the
manner in which the U.S. interprets the treaty so that later problems in
interpretation will be precluded.88
A general fear of expanding international law contributes to U.S.
hesitation over ratification of the Convention. 9 The United States, like
other national governments, would maintain certain advantages in
retaining sovereignty over all areas of law, especially with respect to areas
within the traditionally domestic province of law. Although nations have
gradually come to accept a general body of international law regulating
actions between them to promote an orderly and functioning community
of nations, governments historically have jealously guarded national
sovereignty within their borders, especially regarding issues concerning
their respective citizens.9" National governments do not want domestic
action and authority questioned by foreign governments or international
85. See Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
86. Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 13.
87. SENrE REroRT, supra note 3, at 5.
88. See generally Sax,_5 REIorr, supra note 3.
89. See Hearing i, supra note 1, at 95 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara
Vucanovich).
90. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. IN'L L 866, 869 (1990).
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organizations, nor do they want allegations of transgressions of civil,
political, or human rights to be inspected or judged by the international
community. Therefore, until recent decades, domestic violations of such
rights were not considered to be within the province of international law.
The United States, like all nations, may resist being placed under
the scrutiny of an international committee designed to investigate human
rights violations within the U.S., and to suggest how it should be
implementing the terms of the Convention.9' However, the United States
has already obligated itself to review human rights protections and
violations within its borders and submit its record to international
scrutiny by ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in 1992. The U.S. submitted its first report required by the
Covenant to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Sep-
tember of 1994.92 Joining CEAFDAW would entail a similar assessment
process and would be consistent with other international responsibilities
the U.S. has previously accepted. Reporting to CEDAW should not be
regarded as an obligation but as "an opportunity to publicize our ac-
complishments as a nation."" Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director of the
International Women's Rights Action Watch, testified that the United
States "need not fear the quadrennial reporting and review process
required under the provisions of the Convention. Rather we should look
at that process as an opportunity to show that the U.S. is a leader among
nations in women's human rights."9
In recent decades, human rights have become increasingly recog-
nized as an accepted area for the development of international legal
standards."5 After the globally condemned horrors perpetrated during
91. Gibson, supra note 40, at 57. As Gibson states, "Member states are also quite
sensitive to allegations of non-compliance from both the treaty body and states and
individuals which may complain to the treaty body about specific states' non-
protection of human rights." Unfortunately, CEAFDAW does not currently have i
mechanism in place to permit individual complaints to be submitted to CEDAW,
but it may in the near future. See Donna J. Sullivan, Women's Rights and the z9p3
World Conference on Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 160 (1994).
92. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 181 (requiring submission of reports); William Claiborne, Human Rights Report
Includes Self Criticisr: State DepartmentAcknowledges U.S. Lapses, WASH. PosT, Sept.
13, 1994, at A9.
93. Hearing a, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director of
International Women's Rights Action Watch).
94. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 19,
95. Reisman, supra note 90, at 869. "Although the venerable term 'sovereignty' continues
to be used in international legal practice, its referent in modern international law is
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World War II, the rights of a nation's own citizens have gradually
become subject to international scrutiny, eventually evolving into an
integral component of the international legal framework. Commentators
are calling upon the United States judiciary to utilize international law
as a guide to interpreting the U.S. Constitution, and domestic courts are
increasingly taking international human rights law into account in their
decisions.96 The United States should not deprive itself of the opportuni-
ty to participate in the formulation of these international legal principles.
One of these opportunities entails participation in human rights conven-
tions and their monitoring bodies, such as CEAFDAW and CEDAW.
E. The Preservation of Federalism
Another concern is that CEAFDAW would mandate that the
United States federal government encroach upon areas of law reserved to
quite different. International law still protects sovereignty, but-not surprisingly-it
is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty." See also Gibson,
supra note 40, at 42 ("We still live in a world of states that are sovereign by legal
definition. The rule of international law, however, is rapidly penetrating the anachro-
nism of states' sovereign 'domestic jurisdiction.'"); Rebecca J. Cook, International
Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L& PoL 645, 672
(1992) ("Modern international human rights law has emerged to limit the power that
states may lawfully exercise over individuals, ind'ding their own citizens.... States
have committed themselves to the observance of at least minimum standards of
protection of individual rights through adherence to international human rights trea-
ties.").
96. See, e.g., Auman, supra note 64, at 1:
International human rights law is today an extensive body of agreed-upon
norms and international obligations codified in over 50 international
treaties and dedarations of both a general and fairly specialized nature.
United States lawyers and judges are turning with an increasing frequency
to these laws as a basis for rules of decision and as interpretive guides in
domestic cases involving refugees, detainees, undocumented aliens, and
government activities. The time is ripe for enhanced development and
application of a variety of human rights issues through ratification of
several treaties currently pending before the U.S. Senate Foreign Commit-
tee induding ... the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women.
Id; Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 81; Tamala . Hughlett, International Law:
The Use of International Law as a Guide to Interpretation of the United States Consti-
tution, 45 OKLA. L REv. 169 (1992); Richard B. Lillich, International Human Rights
Law in US. Courts, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L." & Po':y 1 (1993); Ann I. Park, Human
Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1195 (1987).
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the states.97 Various Convention articles provide for the elimination of
discrimination against women in areas of government that have histori-
cally been considered political functions of the several states, such as
regulation of family relations and education. For example, Article 6
concerns the exploitation of women in prostitution; Article 10 addresses
discrimination in education; Article 13 provides for the equal right of
women to family benefits; Article 15 concerns contract and property
rights; and Article 16 addresses areas of family law including property,
divorce, child custody, age of marriage, and family planning. Article 24
of the Convention requires States Parties "to adopt all necessary measures
at the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Convention," 8 which some interpret to
mandate that all provisions be implemented at the national level. 99
Opponents of the Convention warn that it may "bring federal and even
international regulation into areas which are constitutionally reserved to
state, local or private discretion."
100
However, the United States could submit, along with its ratification
of CEAFDAW, an understanding clarifying the distinction between
federal and state powers, and indeed the Clinton Administration and
Foreign Relations Committee have suggested such an understanding.1'
97. Hearing z, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
98. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artide 24.
99. Hearingx, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
100. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 85 (statement of Phyllis Schlafly).
101. SENATE REoRT, supra note 3, at 3. The text of the reservation reads:
The United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented
by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local govern-
ments. To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction
over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appro-
priate measures to ensure the fifillment of this Convention.
State Department Report, supra note 60, at 2. Moreover, Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920), suggests that Congress is not constitutionally barred from ratifying
treaties that concern areas normally beyond congressional legislative power under the
Tenth Amendment. But see Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against
Women, 15 WHrrmR L REv. 319, 338-39 (1994) (panel discussion). A panel
participant argues that such an understanding is unnecessary, as the Convention
simply mandates that "the state party must 'ensure' that public authorities conform
to the treaty, without specifying that federal states must accomplish this by direct
national legislation." She warns that an understanding may "create the false impres-
sion that state and local governments are not bound or that U.S. ratification was
intended to be an empty or hypocritical gesture." For another argument opposing this
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As precedent, the U.S. submitted such an understanding with its ratifica-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 2 This
understanding is not a reservation and is not intended to limit or modify
the international obligations of the United States under the Covenant;
instead, it clarifies the domestic measures to be taken by state and federal
governments in implementing the instrument.10 3 Similarly, Australia has
entered a declaration addressing conflicts between CEAFDAW and its
federal constitutional system of government, stating that implementation
of the treaty, instead of being undertaken solely by the national govern-
ment, will be distributed among the Territory, State, and Common-
wealth Authorities according to their respective constitutional powers."'0
This declaration has not been opposed by any other State Party.0 5 A
similar declaration or understanding by the United States would resolve
the question of federalism. Both Canada and Australia have also consult-
ed with state and provincial officials in order to clarify what objections
their respective provinces or states may have to international conventions,
and how those problems may be surmounted.0 6 The United States could
take similar measures.
understanding, see Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 48-50 (statement of Gay J.
McDougall, Executive Director, International Human Rights Law Group).
102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171. See Stewart, supra note 65, at 1201-1202. According to Stewart,
the understanding states that the Covenant 'shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the State
and local governments.' As to matters within the jurisdiction of state and
local governments, 'the Federal Government shall take measures appropri-
ate to the Federal system' to ensure that the state and local governments
fulfill their obligations.
Id.
103. Stewart, supra note 65, at 1202. Zearfoss, supra note 81, at 929-30. Zearfoss is
concerned that the U.S. might submit a reservation instead of an understanding to
address the issue of federalism, which she argues would absolve the federal govern-
ment of any responsibility under the Convention for discriminatory actions by the
states.
104. Hearingr, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
105. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of Alan Kreceko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
106. David Weissbrodt, Current Development:. A New United Nations Mechanism fir
Encouraging the Ratification of Human Rights Treaties, 76 AM. J. Ihr'L L. 418, 427
(1982).
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E Civil and Political Rights v. Economic,
Socia and Cultural Rights
The fact that the Convention intersperses anti-discrimination clauses
concerning civil and political rights with a prohibition of discrimination
in the economic, social, and cultural spheres of life also raises problems
for some commentators. For example, Article 5 of the Convention
addresses gender discrimination in the context of social and cultural
customs, and encourages governmental attempts to change those practices
when they are discriminatory or prejudicial towards women. Although
civil and political rights are guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution and are
well defined principles in both federal and state government, the con-
cepts of economic, social, and cultural rights and equities remain less
firmly established in the United States.'0 7
In general, the Western approach to human rights issues has
traditionally concentrated on the civil and political dimensions, at the
expense of attention to the economic, social, and cultural dimensions. 08
Because male-dominated national governments may not be as responsive
to women's issues as women in those positions would be, the primary
focus of women's groups in many of such countries has been to obtain
legal and political power equal to that of men through the attainment of
political and civil rights. Therefore, usually in Western countries, wom-
en's achievement of political and civil rights has taken precedence over
the achievement of economic, social, and cultural equality.0 9 In other
107. See generally Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International
Human Rights Law: Toward an 'Entirely New Strategy, 44 HAsTNGS L.J. 79 (1992)
(arguing that economic rights are compatible with U.S. conceptions of rights and that
economic rights should be affirmed by ratifying the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural rights).
108. See generally Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L 1 (1986) (examining the implications of the trend towards a graduated
normativity in international human rights); Stark, supra note 107.
109. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. hr'L
L 613, 618-21 (1991). See also Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 77 (statement of Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch). For example, many people in the United
States believe that Article 15, addressing civil and political rights, is the most
important article of the Convention because it "demands a revision in thinking about
human rights. To deny women full legal capacity goes to the heart of the rule of law
and human rights concepts. Legal capacity is the recognition ofpersonhood: that one
is a human being with a full claim to human dignity." Hearing r, supra note 1, at 77.
Article 15 confronts the second class citizen status that has traditionally been imposed
upon women, particularly married women, in almost all societies. The male of the
household, either the husband or father, has been considered the legal representative
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areas of the world, particularly in Third World countries, women's
organizations have priorities unlike those in the West. Before they can
confront political and civil inequities, they feel that women must first
have basic life necessities and the means to attain economic security,
which are often denied them because they are female. °
The tendency in the West to focus almost exclusively upon civil and
political rights has diverted attention and effort from alleviation of many
other human rights issues affecting women. Recently, however, there has
been a growing call for the recognition of economic, social, and cultural
rights within the United States legal system."' The U.S., acting for its
own national self-interest and the individual interests of its citizens,
should broaden its definition of human rights to include these rights and
help to define them within the international legal system, instead of
attempting to insulate itself from this emerging aspect of international
law.
A related criticism of CEAFDAW made by its opponents in the
United States is that the U.S. should not "impose Western ideals on all
of the world.""' However, as is suggested by the U.S. debate about the
Convention's recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights, which
are supported primarily by women in developing countries, the Con-
vention is not a "Western" document;" 3 it is an international document
created with input from countries all over the world, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly, and signed and ratified by 139
nations.
Both in the United States and internationally, there is a growing
recognition that "[t]he question of human rights abuses against women
is complex because it extends beyond political and civil abuses. There is
of the entire family; women in many countries have been considered little more than
property and have been accorded the legal status of minors throughout their entire
lives.
110. Charlesworth et al., supra note 109, at 618-21.
111. See generally Stark, supra note 107.
112. U.S. Senator Paul Coverdell, "Word from Coverdell," ATLANm CONSvrtnrIoN, Oct.
12, 1994, at A12.
113. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 109.
Despite differences in history and culture, feminists from all worlds share
a central concern: their domination by men.... [T]he constant theme in
both western and Third World feminism is the challenge to structures that
permit male domination, although the form of the challenge and the male
structures may differ from society to society.
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a strong link between economic development and human rights, but
there is the added dimension of social rights for women."" 4 The avail-
ability of the CEAFDAW is an important resource for all women,
irrespective of their priorities, to use in lobbying their governments and
garnering societal support for progressive changes."
5
III. CONCERNS REGARDING SPECIFIC CONVENTION PROVISIONS
Certain concerns have been raised regarding individual provisions of
CEAFDAW, particularly those raised in President Carter's transmittal of
the Convention to the Senate (Articles 2, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 14). These
matters can be remedied through the adoption of implementing legisla-
tion, reservations to certain provisions of the Convention, and declara-
tions and understandings clarifying U.S. interpretations of others.
Although United States law currently may not be in full compliance with
all aspects of the treaty, many proponents are still very much in favor of
U.S. ratification, acknowledging that certain reservations, declarations,
and implementing legislation may be necessary." 6 The problems with
extensive use of reservations are discussed elsewhere in this article;
however, notwithstanding attendant shortcomings, use of such qualifica-
tion is not unusual and many States Parties to CEAFDAW have qualified
their acceptance by reservations." 7 Furthermore, the United States
government should, in principle, be willing to enact implementing
legislation to remedy areas of U.S. law that perpetuate discrimination
against its female citizens. Such legislation would permit the eventual
withdrawal of reservations.
Article 2 describes means through which States Parties will under-
take to eliminate discrimination against women. Article 2(0 contains a
general requirement of nondiscrimination which may present questions
regarding the U.S. policy of discrimination against women in the
military, specifically with respect to certain combat positions and the
draft.18 In order to preserve this policy, the Clinton Administration and
114. Hearing -, supra note 2, at 1 (statement of U.S. Representative Gus Yatron).
115. See generally Charlesworth et al., supra note 109.
116. However, some commentators assert that no reservations, dedarations or understand-
ings are necessary for U.S. ratification of CEAFDAW, and argue for unqualified
ratification. See, e.g., Fletcher et al., supra note 101, at 336.
117. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
118. Hearingr, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee have proposed a reservation specifi-
cally exempting the military-with respect to combat assignments-from
the Convention's nondiscrimination directives.l"9 The Convention makes
no mention of women in the military, and this reservation follows the
precedent of other ratifying nations which have submitted reservations
to exempt their discriminatory policies against women in the military. 20
Article 2(e) mandates nondiscriminatory policies in private orga-
nizations, which may be interpreted to require the federal government to
prohibit the all-male membership requirements of some private associa-
tions, 121 such as male-only clubs and all-male private schools. 122 Similar
concerns regarding private conduct have been raised with respect to other
Articles of the Convention.'"3 The Convention does not require coeduca-
tion, though it is encouraged. 124 In the United States, women generally
cannot be excluded from organizations or institutions which receive
financial support, sponsorship, or tax exemptions from the federal
government. 125 Furthermore, despite constitutional protection for
Department of State). See P.L. 103-160, § 542; Selective Service Act, 50 App. U.S.C.
§ 451 et seq.; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
119. SENAT- REPoRT, supra note 3, at 10. The text of the reservation reads:
Under Current U.S. law and practice, women are permitted to volunteer
for military service without restriction, and women in fact serve in all U.S.
armed services, induding in combat positions. However, the United States
does not accept an obligation under the Convention to assign women to
all military units and positions which may require engagement in direct
combat.
The State Department stated that the exemption of females from the draft does not
fall within the Convention's definition of discrimination. State Department Report,
supra note 60, at 16. For arguments opposing this reservation, see Hearing 3, supra
note 5, at 42-43 (statement of Gay J. McDougall, Executive Director, International
Human Rights Law Group); and Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 68 (statement of
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch).
120. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
121. Hearings, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
122. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Bruce Fein).
123. SEATE REPorr, supra note 3, at 10. Specifically, provisions affecting private conduct
are found in Artides 2, 3, 5, 7, and 13. See State Department Report, supra note 60,
at 16.
124. See CEAFDAW, supra note 4, at Artide 10.
125. See State Department Report, supra note 60, at 11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3123 (1991).
See also Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal
Advisor, Department of State). However, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does
not apply to tax-exempt private dubs, religious institutions, or private employers with
fewer than fifteen employees.
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freedom of association, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld state and
local laws that prohibit private clubs from discriminating against wom-
en.12 6 Nonetheless, in order to preclude potential legal conflicts, for
example with respect to smaller private social organizations that discrimi-
nate against women, the Clinton Administration and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee have recommended a reservation with respect to
private organizations.
127
Because Article 2 makes no exemptions for religious organizations,
the Convention's impact upon the constitutional separation of church
and state128 and its enforcement against gender discrimination within
religious institutions have been questioned.129 Commentators in favor of
ratification have acknowledged that States are constrained by the right of
freedom of religion from interfering in religious matters, including where
religious institutions "discriminate against women and reflect sexist
bigotry." 3 ' However, exercise of religion does not include a right to
financial and other privileges from the government, and States Parties
may be required to revoke such privileges from institutions that continue
to discriminate against women. 3 ' Nonetheless, irrespective of this
126. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of
Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984). See also Fletcher er al., supra note 101, at 340.
127. The reservation reads as follows:
The Constitution and laws of the United States establish extensive
protections against discrimination, reaching all forms of governmental
activity as well as significant areas of non-governmental activity. However,
individual privacy and freedom from governmental influence in private
conduct are also recognized as among the fundamental values of our free
and democratic society. The United States understands that by its terms
the Convention requires broad regulation of private conduct, in particular
under Articles 2, 3 and 5. The United States does not accept any obliga-
tion under the Convention to enact legislation or to take any other action
with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
SEATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. For arguments opposing this reservation, see
Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 38-42 (statement of Gay J. McDougall, Executive Direc-
tor, International Human Rights Law Group); and Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 68
(statement of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch).
128. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof...."
129. Hearingz, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
130. Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility fir Wolations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HAn'.
HuM. RTs. J. 125, 168 (1994).




interpretation of the provision on religion in Article 2 as compatible with
U.S. law, the Clinton Administration and U.S. Foreign Relations
Committee have made clear that the reservation to private organizations
extends to religious institutions.'32
Under Article 7, States Parties agree to ensure equal opportunity of
participation by both women and men in nongovernmental organizations
and other associations dealing with public and political life in the nation.
The United States would unquestionably comply with the Article in
legally condemning discrimination against women in commercial activi-
ties; employment; commercial associations and accommodations; and any
activities receiving sponsorship, funding, or tax exemptions from the
government.'33 Of concern, however, is that this provision may be
interpreted to obligate the United States to interfere with the internal
rules and organization of political parties and interest groups." 4 Such a
requirement may pose an obstacle for U.S. ratification because of possible
constitutional limitations on governmental intrusion into organizations
engaged in political speech, 13' and into private organizations generally.
the privilege of charitable immunity ... of tax privileges, or ... of
accreditation to religiously affiliated medical schools that refuse to train
students in procedures essential to women's health does not inhibit these
institutions' freedom of conscience any more that it limits the freedom of
conscience of other noncharitable, or nonaccredited, institutions.
The same arguments could be made with respect to all private organizations dis-
criminating against women, as in the preceding paragraph. Note, however, potential
conflicts with the First Amendment "establishment of religion" clause, if applied to
a purely religious institution.
132. See SENATE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 23.
133. See, e.g., Hearingi, supra note 1, at 47, 51 (statement ofAlan Kreczko, Deputy Legal
Advisor, Department of State).
134. Heaingi, supra note 1, at 47, 51 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
135. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of
Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984). See also, Fletcher et al., supra note 101, at 343. The authors noted that the
above cases
provide support for an argument that U.S. adherence to Article 7 would
not present a constitutional problem, since the Supreme Court found that
the public policy of promoting non-discrimination outweighed any
associational rights of the formerly all-male members in those cases.
However, the Supreme Court also emphasized that the Jaycees, Rotarians,
and members of New York business dubs were not engaged in any type of
political speech that would be diluted or altered by the admission of female
members.
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Although many of the activities of political parties would be considered
"state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 6 as with previous
provisions, the reservation concerning privacy has been interpreted to
cover these concerns.
137
Article 10, dealing with discrimination against women in education,
may raise federalism concerns because educational issues, such as the
content of educational textbooks and other materials, have been tradi-
tionally regulated primarily by state governments.1 38 These matters can
be remedied through the reservation addressing federalism discussed
above. The United States has met many of the objectives of this Article
through federal legislation designed to eliminate discrimination in edu-
cation by providing that educational institutions receiving federal funds
may not discriminate in school activities, including physical and sports
activities, on the basis of gender.139 Federal legislation also requires non-
discrimination in any program that receives federal financial assistance. 1
40
Additionally, as noted above, the Convention does not mandate coeduca-
tion, although it is encouraged. Therefore, U.S. federal legislation is not
incompatible with the mandates of this Article.
Particular concern has been raised regarding Article 11, which
addresses various aspects of employment discrimination. Conflicts may
arise ifArticle 11 (1)(d) is interpreted to require federal legislation enacting
comparable worth into law, thus upsetting the market labor pricing
136. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 4679-70 (1953) (holding that a political party
deprived blacks of their right to vote by excluding them from the party's primaries);
Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972), cited in SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
137. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 29.
138. See Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (1988).
139. The following statutes include provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sex: Title DC of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(1988); Women's Educational Equity Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3041-3047 (1988); Equal
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1988); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c-9 (1994); Dwight D. Eisenhower
Mathematics and Science Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2981-2993 (1988); Higher
Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448 (1992); Carl
D. Perkins Vocational Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2471 (1988); and 34
C.F.R. §§ 106.1-106.71 (1994). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30-33; State
DepartmentReport, supra note 60, at 26-27. See also Fletcher at al., supra note 101,
at 344; Hearing2, supra note 2, at 190 (statement entitled Written Testimony); and
Hearing i, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Catherine Bocskor, Vice Chair, Section
of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 3123 (1991). See also Hearing2, supra note 2, at 190 (statement entitled
Written Testimony); Hearing i, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Catherine E.




system. 14  Although federal laws do not include comparable worth
protections, 42 the U.S. has made some progress toward the goal of
equalizing pay rates between females and males. In the last decade more
than 1,700 states, counties, and municipalities have corrected disparities
between wage rates of female and male workers in categories of work
determined to be of equal value. Tide VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibits gender discrimination with respect to compensation. The federal
government is required to pay federal employees equal compensation for
work of equal value under the Civil Service Act. 43 The United States
Equal Pay Act of 1963144 mandates equal pay for equal work in positions
with similar working conditions and requiring equal responsibility, efforts,
and skill.
145
In addition, one legal scholar has noted that a State Party's agree-
ment to take "all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination" under
this Article "does not suggest that an immediate comparable worth norm
is mandated by the Convention."1" 6 However, the Clinton Administration
and Senate Foreign Relations Committee have recommended a reservation
to the comparable worth provisions of this article to dearly preserve the
issue for future domestic resolution.
147
141. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
142. E.g., UAW v. Michigan, 886 E2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989); American Nurses' Ass'n
v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716,722-23 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCMEv. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.
143. Hearing 2, supra note 3, at 191 (statement entitled Written Testimony).
144. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1978). See also Hearing 2, supra note
2, at 190-91 (statement entitled Written Testimony); Hearingi, supra note 1, at 70
(statement of Catherine E. Bocskor, Vice Chair, Section of International Law and
Practice, American Bar Association).
145. See State Department Report, supra note 60, at 33 ("Courts have interpreted the [Equal
Pay) Act to mandate equal pay for 'substantially similar' jobs; claims of unequal pay
for comparable but unequal work are inapplicable under the statute."). See, e.g.,
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 271-72 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
146. Fletcher et al., supra note 101, at 345.
147. SENATE REPoRt, supra note 3, at 37. This reservation reads as follows:
U.S. law provides strong protections against gender discrimination in the
area of remuneration, including the right to equal pay for equal work in
jobs that are substantially similar. However, the United States does not
accept any obligation under this Convention to enact legislation establishing
the doctrine of comparable worth as that term is understood in U.S.
practice.
Id. For an argument opposing this reservation, see Hearing3, supra note 5, at 43-45
(statement ofGayJ. McDougall, Executive Director, International Human Rights Law
Group).
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Article 1 1 (1)(f) mandates that the government guarantee to women
the right to safe and healthy working conditions, focusing specifically on
conditions that might affect reproduction. Some have raised the concern
that this provision may call for fetal protection policies that discriminate
against women in employment. A similar provision is found in Article
4(2), permitting, but not mandating, measures to protect maternity.
49
However, CEDAW has expressed reservations about protective employ-
ment policies, preferring instead the provision of full disclosure of risks
to individual employees to allow each to make her own informed
decision. 150 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII
to prohibit discrimination against female employees on the basis of
reproductive capacity in UAW v. Johnson Controls,151 where the Court
held that women may not be excluded from occupations that might have
detrimental effects upon their reproductive systems unless risks unique
to females can be proven. Article 23 states that nothing in the Conven-
tion will affect State law that is "more conducive to the achievement of
equality between men and women;"' 52 therefore, the U.S. prohibition of
discriminatory work policies would not be affected under CEAFDAW.
As neither Article 11(1) (f) nor Article 4(2) requires the establishment of
fetal protection policies, U.S. law is not inconsistent with their man-
dates. 153
Article 11 also prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy or
marital status. The federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act 154 proscribes
discriminatory practices based upon maternity leave or pregnancy. Federal
employment regulations require that employment restrictions applying to
married women must equally apply to married men, 155 and federal
legislation mandates that the federal government cannot discriminate
against employees based on marital status.'56 Many State laws also
148. Zearfoss, supra note 81, at 914-915.
149. See generally Mai Chen, Protective Laws and the Convention on the Elimination ofAll
Forms of Discrimination against Women, 15 WoMENS RTs. L REP. 1, at 14-25
(1993), for a discussion of the concerns raised by the provisions in the Convention
ensuring the protection of maternity, and an interpretation consistent with the
advancement of women's equality.
150. SEaT REPoRr, supra note 3, at 40.
151. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
152. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Artide 23.
153. Fletcher et al., supra note 101, at 345.
154. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1988).
155. See 29 C.ER. § 1604.4(a) (1995); State Department Report, supra note 60, at 36.
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 7202 (1993). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988), which prohibits gender-based discrimination in
employment (i.e., a married woman must be treated equally with a married man).
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prohibit discrimination based on marital status.15 7 Under Article 11 (2) (b)
States Parties agree to undertake to establish maternity leave with pay and
benefits. The United States has enacted the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993,158 providing the right of up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave
to certain public and private sector employees for the birth or adoption
of a child.
As the provision requiring paid maternity leave goes beyond U.S.
legislation in this area, the Clinton Administration and Foreign Relations
Committee have recommended a reservation on this issue.159 Article
11(2) (c) encourages States to promote the creation of a network of child
care facilities, which some people feel should best be left to national or
state governments and not be required by an international agreement. 160
However, this provision does not mandate a federal child care system or
the right to child care. Moreover, the federal government presently has
programs providing day care for federal employees, providing tax deduc-
tions to assist working parents in attaining child care, and making funds
available to states to encourage the establishment of day care centers.
16 1
Questions have been raised about the interpretation of Article 12's
prohibition of gender discrimination in the provision of health care
services and family planning. Opponents to the Convention have ex-
pressed concern that this provision may prohibit private or government
restrictions on abortions, including the ability to not offer or provide
funding for abortion services if other medical services are offered or sub-
sidized.'62 This interpretation is based on the Pregnancy Discrimination
157. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Catherine E. Bocskor, Vice Chair, Section
on International Law and Practice, American Bar Association).
158. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (1993) et seq. See also
State Department Report, supra note 60, at 36-37.
159. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 2. The text of the reservation reads:
Current U.S. law contains substantial provisions for maternity leave in
many employment situations but does not require paid maternity leave.
Therefore, the United States does not accept an obligation under Article
11(2)(b) to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social
benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39. See generally, Chen, supra note 149, at 14-25
(a discussion of the paid maternity leave provision of the Convention). For an
argument opposing this reservation, see Hearing3, supra note 5, at 45-46 (statement
by Gay J. McDougall, Executive Director, International Human Rights Law Group,
and Hearing3, supra note 5, at 68 (statement of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director,
Human Rights Watch).
160. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S. Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
161. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 38.
162. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 79-80 (statement of Bruce Fein, Attorney and Syndicated
Columnist). See also Hearing x, supra note 1, at 84 (statement of Ellen Smith, Field
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Act,163 in which Congress equates pregnancy discrimination with gender
discrimination.
However, one cominentator has noted that "[t]he travaux
priparatoires do not indicate that this [provision] was intended to include
legal abortion, and CEDAW has not so construed it."' 64 The Clinton
Administration has also stated that "[n]othing inArticle 12 requires States
Parties to guarantee access to abortion. 1 65 However, the Administration
also expressed that if a State Party considered abortion to be an appropri-
ate medical service related to pregnancy, the Article could be interpreted
to require the inclusion of access to abortion among other services
provided, which would be contrary to current U.S. law.16
Conversely, pro-choice U.S. citizens would view protection of the
right to abortion as one of the Convention's virtues. 67 One scholar has
argued in favor of the international protection of women's reproductive
rights, including the right to safe abortions, as a composite right founded
upon separate rights granted under CEAFDAW and other international
instruments. 68 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the
right to abortion may not be denied to women in the United States, as
it is encompassed in the constitutional right to privacy derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment.
169
However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted a
proposal by Senator Jesse Helms to submit upon ratification an under-
standing "[t]hat nothing in this Convention shall be construed to reflect
Legislative Counsel, Concerned Women for America). The abortion issue also
concerns Artide 16(1)(e), which mandates that Parties must permit women "to decide
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children." CEAFDAW,
supra note 1, Artide 16. Representative Barbara Vucanovich expressed her concern
that the section may be interpreted to require the legalization of abortions throughout
the full term of pregnancy. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of U.S.
Representative Barbara Vucanovich).
163. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1988).
164. Fletcher et al., supra note 101, at 345.
165. SENATE RnPoRT, supra note 3, at 41. See also State Department Report, supra note 101,
at 40.
166. SATmE REPostr, supra note 3, at 41; State Department Report, supra note 60, at 40.
See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (allowing federal restrictions of
Medicaid funding for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (allowing state
restrictions of Medicaid funding for abortions).
167. See Zearfoss, supra note 81, at 913-14 (regretting that CEAFDAW does not specifi-
cally protect abortion rights).
168. See generally Cook, supra note 95.




or create any right to abortion and in no case should abortion be
promoted as a method of family planning." 170 This understanding is not
only unnecessary, as neither the Convention, the travauxpreparatoires, nor
CEDAW requires. States Parties to guarantee abortion services; it is also
directly contrary to U.S. law, as it does not reflect the constitutional
guarantee to women of the right to choose an abortion. Furthermore, it
is redundant in light of an understanding the Clinton Administration
proposed to the same Article, which was also accepted by the Foreign
Relations Committee, clarifying the U.S.'s interpretation that the Article
allows States Parties to determine domestically the appropriateness of
different family planning methods, and does not require States to provide
free access to particular pregnancy-related services.
171
One concern raised in conjunction with Article 14(2) is that it may
require additional spending by the U.S. government and the expansion
of federal benefit programs. Specifically, this provision requires States
Parties to guarantee to rural women access to sufficient facilities providing
health care, which may be interpreted to obligate the government to alter
budget allocations and increase financing of these programs. However,
the object of this Article is to eliminate discrimination against women in
rural areas, and in the United States all federal health care programs,
whether administered in urban or rural areas, cannot be administered in
an intentionally discriminatory manner under the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments 172 and the Civil Rights Act.173 Discrimination against rural
women in the provision of federally supported health care services is
specifically prohibited in the Public Health Service Act." The Clinton
170. SEN rE Rm'oR, supra note 3, at 52.
171. SEATE REPoar, supra note 3, at 42. The reservation reads as follows:
The United States understands that Artide 12 permits States Parties to
determine which health care services are appropriate in connection with
family planning, pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, as well
as when the provision of free services is necessary, and does not mandate
the provision of particular services on a cost-free basis.
Id For an argument opposing this understanding, see Hearing 3, supra note 5, at
46-48 (statement by Gay J. McDougall, Executive Director, International Human
Rights Law Group).
172. State Department Report, supra note 60, at 44.
173. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3123 (1991). See Hearingi, supra note 1, at 70 (state-
ment of Catherine E. Bocksor, Vice Chair, Section on International Law and Practice,
American Bar Association).
174. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 292d, 295j (1988) (These provisions apply
to programs supported by the Department of Education.).
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Administration has expressed its belief that "[a]s a general matter, federal
law neither authorizes or [sic] permits unequal treatment of, or discrimi-
nation against, women in rural areas."
175
As demonstrated in this section, the concerns raised by the Carter
Administration and others with respect to particular articles of
CEAFDAW can be satisfied. The Clinton Administration has recom-
mended one additional understanding and two additional declarations to
the Convention. The understanding provides that nothing in the Con-
vention will constrict the right to freedom of speech under the First
Amendment to the Constitution. 76 The two declarations state that the
Convention will be non-self-executing, as addressed above, and that the
United States retains the right to decline participation in cases brought
before the International Court of Justice under Article 29."'
175. SENATE RroRT, supra note 3, at 44. See alo State Department Report, supra note 118,
at 43.
176. SEmTE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 27. The text of the understanding reads:
The Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive
protections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association.
Accordingly, the United States does not accept any obligation under this
Convention, in particular under Articles 5, 7, 8, and 13, to restrict those
rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to the
extent that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Id
177. SENArE RnPor, supra note 3, at 49-50. The text of the declarations reads as follows:
1) "The United States declares that the provisions of the Convention are not self-
executing;" SEATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 49; and 2)
With reference to Article 29(2), the United States declares that it does not
consider itself bound by the provisions of Article 29(1). The specific
consent of the United States to the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice concerning disputes over the interpretation or application of this
Convention is required on a case-by-case basis.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 50. For arguments opposing the reservation
concerning the International Court ofJustice, see Hearing3, supra note 5, 21, 29-32
(statement of Robert F. Drinan, American Bar Association); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 51-52 (statement of Gay J. McDougall, Executive Director, International
Human Rights Law Group); and SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 69-70 (statement
of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch).
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. The Legal Effect of the Convention
under International Law
One concern with all international human rights treaties is deter-
mining their legal effect under international law. Some scholars have
concluded that the Convention is merely a statement of goals to be
attained at some unspecified future date and through unspecified means,
and therefore that the Convention has no power to effectively bind States
Parties. Professor Brenda Cossman writes that "[f]rom its beginnings,
international human rights law has been limited by problems of enforce-
ment .... It has relied primarily on international cooperation, moral
suasion and condemnation to ensure compliance." However, she contin-
ues, "despite the weakness of the enforcement machinery and the history
of non-cooperation, there remains a strong commitment to the discourse
of human rights principles."
178
Others believe that the Convention is a codification of already
existing customary law, and as such is binding upon all States, whether
or not they have signed or ratified the Convention. For example, Paula
Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Bilateral and Multilateral
Affairs of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the
U.S. State Department, testified that "we believe that, under existing
international standards, all governments already have an obligation not
only to abstain from practicing institutionalized discrimination, but also
to take affirmative steps to protect women against abuses rooted in
cultural and societal norms."
179
Still others assert, and this author believes, that international human
rights conventions, along with their monitoring bodies, contribute to the
progressive evolution of international law.' They are not simply a list
of aspirations with no meaningful consequences if they are not imple-
178. Brenda Cossman, Reform, Revolution, or Retrenchment? International Human Rights in
the Post-Cold War Era, 32 HAv. Irr'L L J. 339, 339-40 (1991).
179. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 116 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
180. Hearing i, supra note 1, at 99 (statement of U.S. Representative Patricia Saiki). Her
description of the Convention states that "[t]his treaty establishes legal standards for
the treatment of women worldwide and can be best described as an international bill
of rights for women." Id. See also Gibson, supra note 40, at 41-42.
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mented, nor are they a stagnant codification of previously existing
international law. As Professor John Gibson writes of CEAFDAW and
the other international human rights conventions:
Each treaty is grounded in the sources of international law set
forth in article thirty-eight of the Statute of the International
Court of'Justice. Each has a moral foundation based on custom,
fundamental principles, judicial decisions of varying and historic
authority, as well as the writings of eminent publicists, scholars
and jurists. Each is rooted in a "right" found in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Rights, therefore making each treaty
a legal amplification of the basic rights and thus developing the
"progressive measures" called for in the Preamble of the Decla-
ration."'
These international human rights agreements are legally binding; all
Member States agree to be accountable and to hold the other Member
States accountable for their implementation. They also contribute to the
evolution of general norms of customary international law, as the
principles therein receive greater international acceptance and approval.
A related issue is the fact that CEAFDAW, like other human rights
conventions, is of a "progressive nature," which poses problems in
determining whether or not a State is in compliance with its terms. This
latitude was considered necessary by the drafters of the Convention,
because many nations may not have sufficient resources, both material
and political, to immediately effectuate all of the treaty's provisions.
Therefore, both the time frame and the means of implementation have
been largely left up to the States Parties themselves.
Critics of the progressive nature of international conventions assert
that to take steps
for the realization of rights was not equivalent to guaranteeing
these rights; that a state criticized for doing nothing could
always plead lack of resources; and that to allow states to
achieve "progressively" the realization of the economic, social,
and cultural rights would permit indefinite delays. Because the
obligations under the [convention] thus could easily be evaded,




181. Gibson, supra note 40, at 49.
182. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Right; of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 40 (1982).
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However, if CEAFDAW were not of a progressive nature, the drafters
would run the risk that no nation would ratify the treaty, or if they did
ratify, that they would withdraw when they could not come into com-
pliance with the Convention, or that they would ratify the Convention
without being able to fulfill its terms, which would undermine the rule
of international law." 3 Additionally, the progressive nature of interna-
tional treaties is not a new idea, as "the concept of progress and pro-
gressive development is both implicit and explicit in so much of the
[U.N.] Charter and the International law it has generated.""8 4
That the international legal system is not fully developed, however,
is no reason for the United States to refrain from ratifying CEAFDAW
and other international human rights treaties, and has not prevented it
from ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966.185 As one of the most powerful and internationally important
nations in the world, the United States cannot remain aloof from the
increasingly significant development of international principles of human
rights, but should actively participate in their creation and implementa-
tion.
B. The Impact of Reservations
A particular problem that has arisen with CEAFDAW is that many
countries, in conjunction with ratification, have submitted extensive
reservations to various provisions of the Convention. Over fifty countries
have submitted reservations, often more than one, upon ratification of
the Convention."8 6 As of the spring of 1990, 113 reservations had been
made to CEAFDAW, and ninety-five objections had been made to these
reservations.18 7 Some of these reservations are technical or address the
Article concerning dispute settlement, and have received no opposition
from other States Parties. However, several of the reservations to
183. Sohn, supra note 182, at 40.
184. Gibson, supra note 40, at 43.
185. William Claiborne, Human Rights Report Includes Self-Criticism: State Department
Acknowledges US. Lapses, WASH. PosT, Sept. 13, 1994, at A9.
186. SEN"E REnour, supra note 3, at 53. See also Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J.
IN'L L. 281,282-83 (1991) ("In comparison with other U.N. treaties, although not
with other human rights treaties, this is a large number of reservations.").
187. Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. IN'L L. 643, 644 (1990).
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substantive provisions of the Convention have incited opposition by other
States Parties, which claim that the reservations are contrary to the "object
and purpose" of .CEAFDAW and, therefore, are impermissible and
unacceptable.1
8 8
The question then becomes how to determine whether a particular
reservation is impermissible, and how to treat such reservations and
objections. The reservations issue has sparked considerable debate both
within and outside of the United Nations. Different interpretations of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) have
expanded the debate. 9 The interpretation of the effect of reservations
to international agreements is addressed in this Convention. 90 It defines
a reservation as "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made
by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State."' 9' States
are not allowed to make a reservation if the treaty expressly prohibits the
reservation, if the treaty permits only specified reservations (which do not
include the reservation in question), or if the reservation contravenes the
188. See Clark, supra note 186, at 282-89.
189. Clark, supra note 186, at 320-21. Clark has noted that
[t]he comparatively high rate of reservations to human rights treaties
suggests that such treaties have particular need of a workable reservations
regime. The [CEAFDAW] reservations illustrate some of the problems
inherent in the regime of the Vienna Convention, especially the difficulty
of assessing the compatibility of non-specific reservations, the disagreement
over the permissibility of incompatible reservations, the defeating effect of
reservations purporting to suspend nonderogable provisions, and the
objecting state's lack of satisfactory options when reciprocity is not an
appropriate sanction.
Id. at 320. She recommends that
[d]ifferentiating between derogable and nonderogable provisions to make
reservations to nonderogable provisions impermissible and adopting a
collegiate system of accepting reservations are two amendments that would
protect the normative value of human rights treaties while retaining the
basic features of the regime of the Vienna Convention (the nonunanimity
rule and the compatibility criterion).
Id. at 321.
190. AnnaJenefsky, Permissibility ofEgp:t' Reservationi to the Convention on the Elimination
ofAUlForms ofDiscrimination Against Women, 15 MD. J. INr'L L & Taiwa 199, 208
(1991).
191. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened fr signature May 23, z969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion], quoted in Jenefsky, supra note 190, at 208.
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object and purpose of the treaty.192 The last qualification on reservations
often poses interpretive problems because no mechanism exists to
determine whether a specific reservation is incompatible with the object
and purpose of a treaty. Therefore, the State making the reservation is
the sole judge of whether the reservation is consistent with the object and
purpose of the treaty, and although other States Parties may object to the
reservation, these objections are usually of minimal practical conse-
quence.' 93 The reservations and objections do, however, alter the effect
of the treaty between the reserving and objecting States, thus creating a
network of different treaty relationships among the States Parties to the
Convention.1
94
Many governments, international organizations, and commentators
have called upon States Parties to CEAFDAW to withdraw reservations
to the substantive portions of the Convention.'" For example, the
Programme of Action developed at the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights "urges states to withdraw reservations 'that are contrary
to the object and purpose of the Convention or which are otherwise
incompatible with international treaty law;' [and] it encourages CEDAW
to continue its review of the reservations to the Convention."196 Com-
mentators have also called for the creation of mechanisms to regulate the
submission of reservations to the Convention, similar to those embodied
in other human rights treaties. For example, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 97 upon which
CEAFDAW is modeled, provides that a reservation will be considered
incompatible with the Racial Convention if at least two-thirds of the
States Parties object to it.19' This mechanism has been very successful in
minimizing the number of reservations modifying the treaty. 199
192. Vienna Convention, supra note 191, at 336-37, quoted in Jenefsky, supra note 190,
at 208.
193. Jenefsky, supra note 190, at 210. See also Laura A. Donner, Gender Bias in Drafting
InternationalDiscrimination Conventions: The 1979 Women " Convention Compared with
the x965 Racial Convention, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 241, 252 (1994) ("[The Legal
Advisor to the United Nations opined that not even [CEDAWI is authorized to
determine the incompatibility of reservations.").
194. Clark, supra note 186, at 297.
195. See Clark, supra note 186, for a recitation of the history of U.N. Member States' and
U.N. agencies' objections to the number and kind of reservations that have been made
to CEAFDAW.
196. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 160.
197. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, March 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
198. Donner, supra note 193, at 252.
199. Donner, supra note 193, at 252. "with 128 State Parties, there are only four reserva-
tions that are purported modifications or exclusions of the obligations assumed under
the treaty." Id.
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C Lack of an Enforcement Mechanism
A major shortcoming of CEAFDAW concerns the means of ensuring
the implementation of the treaty. As with the other major international
human rights treaties, CEAFDAW does not have an enforcement
mechanism. Therefore, although some have interpreted CEAFDAW and
other international human rights treaties to be legally binding, 00 the legal
effectiveness of the Convention is open to question because there are no
means of international enforcement. Professor Louis Sohn notes that "[o]n
the international scene, it is difficult to persuade governments, which as
a group are the international lawmakers, to agree on enforcement against
themselves in the event that they violate international law. It is not the
law that is soft, but the governments. "201
Under CEAFDAW, the States Parties agree to implement changes
within their borders and in their domestic legal systems to give effect to
the treaty's provisions. However, often it is the government itself, with
the power and duty of enforcement of the Convention, which is perpe-
trating the human rights violations. All national governments worldwide
are predominantly male; therefore, not only are the rights of women likely
to be given low priority and viewed from a distorted perspective, but
those in power (usually men) often have a stake in perpetuating the
system of male dominance and in continuing discrimination against
women.20 2 In the words of Arvonne S. Fraser, "in this day of burgeoning
democracies all over the world we ought to recognize discrimination
against women as the last bastion of human rights abrogation that is
tolerated, even sometimes extolled in the name of custom. '"203 Males
derive distinct benefits through the enjoyment of a position of power over
women, and from the exclusion of women from certain areas in which
the female would be in competition with the male, including education,
politics, and employment. 2 4 As U.S. Representative Patricia Saiki aptly
stated, "[a]s we know from our own experiences in the United States,
equality mandated does not always translate into equality practiced."205
These are powerful obstacles to effective implementation of the Conven-
tion and enforcement of its provisions.
200. Hearing i, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Senator Alan Cranston).
201. Sohn, supra note 182, at 13.
202. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 109, at 625.
203. Hearing 2, supra note 2; at 13 (statement ofArvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch).
204. Charlesworth et al., supra note 109, at 626.
205. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 99 (statement of U.S. Representative Patricia Saiki).
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Although the Convention does not specifically provide for means of
enforcement or implementation, it does exert a significant political
influence and force of moral suasion within the community of nations.
The Convention does contain a procedural mechanism to internationally
monitor the progress of nations in effecting their implementation schemes
domestically. As noted above, the treaty calls for the formation of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) to review reports from States Parties concerning the domestic
status of women. CEDAW also reviews the measures each State has
undertaken to eradicate discrimination and improve the economic, legal,
and social status of women. These reports are to be submitted to
CEDAW within one year of ratification of the Convention, and every
four years thereafter, or upon the specific request of the Committee.
During the Committee's review, the representatives who submit
reports may be (and frequently are) questioned as to specific portions of
the report, deficiencies, discrepancies between the report and outside
information, and other areas in which the Committee has questions or
comments. The reporting ensures that the State Party will review its
domestic law to identify areas of discrimination against women; require
a thorough review of current developments in those areas; monitor
progress in securing women's rights under the Convention; motivate the
establishment of long-term programs in order to remedy culturally
ingrained discrimination; encourage coordination among various sectors
of the government and society to advance women's rights; acknowledge
difficult problems that may be hard to remedy; and facilitate the exchange
of information, both domestically and internationally. 6
Although the quality of the, reports varies, those countries under
scrutiny usually are sensitive to any criticisms of the Committee. Con-
sequently, each State is inclined to project the status of its women, and
the measures taken to eliminate gender discrimination, in the best possible
light. In order to offset this distortion, the Committee has "consistently
asked reporting countries to include information on both the de jure and
defacto situation of women. This is because women sometimes have equal
legal standing in law but the laws are interpreted or enforced in a
discriminatory manner."0 7 In addition, CEDAW and other human rights
bodies should be encouraged to develop international standards for
collecting and compiling data and information, in order to inhibit States
from suppressing negative reports. 08
206. Ginger, supra note 83, at 1366-68.
207. Hearing2, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch).
208. Cook, supra note 130, at 162.
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An ancillary problem concerns the amount of freedom (or lack
thereof) that the representatives presenting the reports to the Committee
have in portraying a true account of the situation in their countries. Some
of the representatives are chosen and are permitted to give the reports
only on the condition that they will present the official view propounded
by the government. Such representatives are not allowed to give their
independent assessment of the status of women in their countries or to
testify to incidents of discrimination they may have witnessed or encoun-
tered.20 9 Therefore, the reports that the Committee and the international
community of nations receive may present, at best, a very distorted
portrait of the situation of women in the reporting States.
Although the reporting requirement is imperfect and by no means
an "enforcement mechanism," the process of reporting, international
monitoring, and scrutiny can have a significant and salubrious effect upon
States involved in the system. This is particularly true when citizens of
a country take note of the proceedings, monitor how their State is
perceived internationally,21 and apply pressure to their government to
improve its international image by taking action to enforce the Conven-
tion. Some States Parties, however, maintain their reports as classified
documents and do not inform their citizens of the existence of State
obligations under the Convention,21 thereby thwarting the ability of a
grassroots movement to consolidate around the mandates of CEAFDAW.
In light of this fact, the Committee and concerned States Parties should
209. Hearing2, supra note 2, at 9-10 (statement of U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder).
According to Schroeder,
[o]ne of the problems we have found with U.N. conferences on women's
issues, to be perfectly honest, is that many of the women attending the
U.N. conferences are not free agents. They are sent by their government
with their government's portfolio, and if you speak with them quietly in
the cloakroom they tell you one thing, but when they get to the micro-
phone they have to carty the government's portfolio, That is why it is very
frustrating in breaking through these issues. It is like, 'We will send you
if you will go there and say that everything is terrific, and wonderful,' and
so forth. But I think you find that in all sorts of international conferences
and it is why it is hard to make progress on that.
210. Hearing 2,supra note 2, at 72 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch). According to Fraser, in contrast to most
people in the United States, citizens of other countries "are much more aware of what
the world thinks of them."
211. Anne Bayefiky, Resolving Conflicting Human Rights Standards in International Law,
85 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 356 (1991).
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urge that all reports be open to the public and widely distributed, and
should attempt to attain as much international publicity about the
Convention and the proceedings of the Committee as possible.
D. The Lack of a Provision Addressing
Violence against Women
A significant deficiency of the Convention is the lack of any pro-
vision concerning violence against women. 2 In partial remedy of this
problem, CEDAW stated that discrimination against women as defined
in Article 1 of the Convention addresses gender-based violence.
213
CEDAW also addressed this issue through recommendations that all
States Parties include within their reports not only the legislation they
have implemented to eliminate violence against women, but also the types
of social services they have established to assist women who have been
victims of violence based on gender. The Committee also recommended
specific measures to be taken by States Parties to eliminate violence
against women, such as providing civil remedies and criminal penalties
for such acts.
214
212. See Zearfoss, supra note 81, at 916. Zearfoss also comments that the issues of abor-
tion, pornography, rape, and the special concerns of lesbians and unmarried hetero-
sexual women are not addressed in the Convention. These issues could be addressed
in a manner similar to that of violence against women, as described in this section.
213. Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing
Intimate Violence, 26 CoNEL IN'L L.J. 565, 580 (1993). CEDAW's interpretive
recommendation states in part:
Traditional attitudes under which women are regarded as subordinate. ..
or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving
violence or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage,
dowry deaths, acid attacks, female circumcision. Such prejudices and
practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or
control of women. The effect of such violence to the physical and mental
integrity of women is to deprive them of the equal enjoyment, exercise and
knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms... mhe underly-
ing [structural] consequences of these forms of gender-based violence help
to maintain women in subordinate roles, contribute to their low level of
political participation and to their lower level of education, skills and work
opportunities.
Violence Against Women, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 11th Sess., General Recommendation No. 19, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992), cited in REHOF, supra note 35, at 320.
214. Hearing r, supra note 1, at 78 (statement by International Women's Rights Action
Watch). Over fifty percent of the States Parties that have reported to the Committee
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
The U.N. Commission on the Status of Women passed a resolution
entitled "Physical Violence Against Detained Women That Is Specific to
Their Sex" during its 34th Session in 1990, which was subsequently
adopted by ECOSOC. This resolution requests that all Member States
of the U.N. submit a report to the Secretary-General on legislative
measures taken in their respective countries to protect women in state
custody from such violence.215 In addition, the Commission developed
a "Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women"
in 1992,216 which was adopted by ECOSOC in 1993217 and was adopted
by the General Assembly as the United Nations Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence Against Women in 1993."'
Thus, although the issue of violence is still not addressed within the
document of the Convention, it has been addressed by the Commission
and the Committee. Furthermore, the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights focused attention on the need to eradicate the problem
of widespread gender-based violence.2 9 As a result, the Commission on
Human Rights subsequently appointed a special rapporteur to investigate
violence against women within U.N. Member States.220 Nevertheless, the
neglect of the issue of violence against women in CEAFDAW is a distinct
shortcoming and should be remedied through an amendment to the
Convention. Such an amendment would serve to draw more extensive
international attention to the problem of violence against women, and
would officially require reporting on gender-related violence within the
periodic country reports.
have made note of violence against women. See U.N. Doc. CEDAWICI19924, at
8 (1992). See also State Department Report, supra note 60, at 19.
215. Hearing 2, supra note 1, at 129 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
216. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Vioknce Against Women, U.N. Commission
on the Status of Women, U.N. Doc EICN.6IWG.2/1992/L.3 (1992), cited in
Goldberg, supra note 213, at 569.
217. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N.
ESCOR, U.N. Doc. AIC.31481L.5 (1993), cited in Goldberg, supra note 213, at 580.
218. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., G.A. Res. 104, Supp. No. 49, U.N.Doc. A/48/49 (1993), cited
in Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture, 25 COLUM. H.R L. REv. 291, 293 (1994).
219. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 164.
220. Ameica' Fundamental Dedication to Human Rights, Dispatch (U.S. Department of
State) Feb. 6, 1995 at 10 [hereinafter Dispatch].
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E. CEDAWs Need for a Complaint and Communication Process
CEDAW does not have a complaint and communication process
designed to allow other States Parties, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), or individuals to bring complaints against States Parties for
violations of the Convention.22' Other human rights conventions, such
as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, contain such mechanisms through an Optional Protocol.22 The
United States has acceded to such a provision in the Covenant in Civil
and Political Rights 3 allowing State Parties to bring complaints before
the Human Rights Committee against other States who are not fulfilling
their obligations under that treaty
24
Adding this process to CEAFDAW would allow information in
addition to the officially sanctioned reports of State Parties to be pre-
sented to the Committee. The communication process should also provide
for the formal submission of information to CEDAW from NGOs, which
currently are permitted to attend and observe public meetings, but do not
share, any formal role with CEDAW in monitoring violations against
women.225 A communications process would serve to motivate States to
actually change disparate domestic practice and to affirmatively act
221. See Theodor Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of Discrimination
Against Women, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 216-217 (1990).
222. Gibson, supra note 40, at 54 (discussing the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195).
223. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
224. Stewart, supra note 65, at 1204-05. Stewart notes that "[tihe United States intends
to participate actively in the work of the Committee, in part because of the hope that
the Committee can contribute even more to the development of a generally accepted
international law of human rights." Id. at 1205.
225. Donner, supra note 193, at 250. Donner notes that "[w]ithout detailed information
from other sources, CEDAW must rely on the reports of the state parties, which often
exaggerate or provide only selective information about the state's accomplishments."
Id See also Ginger, supra note 83, at 1387-88, quoting Cecil Bernard, The Preparation
and Drafting of a National Report, in MAuAL ON HumN RIGHTS REPORTING at 21,
U.N. Doc. HR/Pub/91/1, U.N. Sales No. E.91.xiv.1 (1991).
It seems dear that the early involvement of groups outside the government
in the reporting process offers an opportunity for critical discussion between
the government and its citizens, thereby enabling the political leadership
to identify more easily situations that constitute violations of human rights,
or that represent a factor or difficulty in implementing rights contained in
a treaty.
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towards eliminating discrimination against women. At present, States
Parties may only subject another Party to arbitration or raise issue with
it before the International Court of Justice to obtain an opinion concern-
ing interpretation of the terms of the Convention or its implementa-
tion.22 The Programme of Action resulting from the 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights directed CEDAW and the Commission
on the Status of Women to investigate the possibility of adding an
optional protocol to the Convention establishing a complaints mecha-
227nism.
The U.N. Commission on the Status of Women does have a
communications process, and individuals or NGOs may bring allegations
of discrimination against women to the attention of the Commission.
However, complaints to the Commission do not encompass all of the
terms provided for in the Convention, and are addressed only through
recommendations to ECOSOC when the Commission perceives a distinct
pattern or practice of gender discrimination.228 Both the Commission and
the Committee should have the authority to receive such communications
officially. This would expand the available avenues through which
individual women and other State and non-State actors could draw
international attention to specific incidents, practices, and policies of
discrimination against and abuse of women throughout the world.
F. CEDAWs Need for Increased Time and
Resources and Special Rapporteurs
According to Article 20 of the Convention, CEDAW may "normally
meet for a period of not more than two weeks annually in order to
consider the reports submitted," a period of time insufficient even for its
limited mandate of reviewing reports.229 No other international human
rights conventions place such strict temporal constraints upon their
monitoring bodies.23' The word "normally," which may be interpreted
226. CEAFDAW, supra note 4, Article 29.
227. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 160.
228. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 129-31 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
229. Donner notes that "[w]ith 111 state parties and consideration of an average of 6 re-
ports per session, it would take about 19 years to review just one report from each
party." Donner, supra note 193, at 250 (footnote omitted). She also comments that
the only thing preventing the overworked committee from breaking down is,
ironically, the noncompliance of States Parties with the reporting requirement.
230. Meron, supra note 221, at 214. Meron notes that
[t]his limitation has proved to be a serious obstade to the Committee in
examining, both thoroughly and promptly, the periodic reports on measures
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to enable the Committee to extend the duration of its meeting period,
provides some amount of flexibility to the Committee."' For example,
the Committee's 1993 session was extended to a month, the longest
period of time the Committee has convened thus far.232 The General
Assembly should ensure that the Committee is allowed sufficient time in
order to successfully fulfill its tasks under the Convention.
In order to properly function, CEDAW must also be supported by
an adequate and competent staff. Article 17 states that "[t]he Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and
facilities for the effective performance of the Committee under the present
Convention." States Parties should ensure that the Secretary-General
fulfills this obligation. Of course, any addition to the workload of
CEDAW, such as an optional protocol establishing a communication
process, would also have to be taken into account with an appropriate
revision of the time period within which the Committee is allowed to
convene.
The appointment of special rapporteurs to investigate violations of
CEAFDAW could also encourage implementation of the Convention.
233
For example, the Commission on Human Rights established such a
rapporteur in 1989 to investigate the health consequences for women and
children resulting from traditional practices such as female circumcision
and to report to a sub-commission created to investigate such practices. 2
4
Most recently, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a
special rapporteur to investigate violence against women. 1 5 The Com-
mission on the Status of Women, in conjunction with the Commission
on Human Rights, could appoint additional thematic rapporteurs with
mandates to investigate and report violations of gender equality, to receive
adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Convention and in conduct-
ing a meaningful dialogue with representatives of states parties in its
discussion of state reports.... The inadequacy of the time available to the
Committee has resulted inevitably in a backlog in the consideration of
reports.
Id See also Donner, supra note 193, at 250.
231. Meron, supra note 221, at 214.
232. Conversation with Douglas M. Erpf, Public Relations and Development Director,
International League for Human Rights, in New York (February 1993).
233. Meron, supra note 221, at 215-16. The rapporteurs' mandates could cover both the
implementation efforts in specific countries and individual provisions or articles in
the Convention in particular geographic regions or worldwide.
234. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 149 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
235. Dispatch, supra note 220, at 10.
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information from U.N. Member States and intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, to respond to allegations of serious
violations, and to recommend actions to prevent continuing and future
violations." The possibility of falling under the investigation of special
rapporteurs may very likely encourage States Parties to increase their
efforts to implement the Convention and improve the status of women,
rather than implementing the terms of the Convention only on paper.
237
G. The Bfircation of Women's Rights
firom Other Human Rights
Another concern with CEAFDAW is that it further segregates
women's rights from the more mainstream, gender-neutral human rights
instruments and structures in the U.N. system.2 38 Many human rights
issues specific to women have been neglected in such international human
rights documents and U.N. organizations, and this argument holds that
efforts should be directed toward including the concerns of women in
these pre-existing instruments and the mainstream U.N. structure, instead
of creating an entirely separate system to address women's rights.
Bifurcation is the result of several convergent factors, including the
historic practice of gender discrimination within the several U.N.
Member States, the traditional distinction between public and private
spheres delimiting governmental responsibility, the focus of NGOs on
issues affecting primarily males, and the geographical separation of the
U.N. agencies concerning women's rights from those concerning main-
stream human rights. The primary historical reason for the bifurcation
of women's human rights issues is predicated upon the fact that the
international conventions, and the United Nations system itself, have
been created by the collective will of the States. The State governments
have been dominated by males, who benefit from the subordination of
women and "are largely bound by custom and have a tendency to
perpetuate usual practices," such as the traditional practices of gender
discrimination. 9 However, custom and tradition should not be accepted
236. Meron, supra note 221, at 215-16.
237. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 153 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
238. See Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 82 (statement of Felice Gaer, Executive Director,
International League for Human Rights).
239. Hearing2, supra note 2, at 36 (statement of Felice Gaer, Executive Director, Interna-
tional League for Human Rights). See generally Charlesworth et al., supra note 109.
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as a justification enabling Member States to neglect the human rights of
women.
240
Another reason for bifurcation is that gender discrimination issues
are often perceived by national governments as private matters outside
the scope of state responsibility, consequently resulting in the neglect of
gender discrimination issues by both the international structure and
national governments. 241 In the words of one commentator, "modern
international law rests on and reproduces various dichotomies between
the public and private spheres, and the 'public' sphere is regarded as the
province of international law."2 2 However, this public/private distinction
in both domestic and international law has been increasingly criticized,
and is gradually disintegrating. John Gibson notes that "[tlhe rule of
international law ... is rapidly penetrating the anachronism of states'
240. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Senator Jan Meyers). See also Hearing z,
supra note 2, at 3 (statement by U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder); Hearing 2,
supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, International
Women's Rights Watch).
241. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Felice Gaer, Executive Director, Interna-
tional League for Human Rights). For detailed discussions of the private/public
dichotomy in national and international human rights law, see generally Nancy Kim,
Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence between Western
Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. Rav. 49 (1993);
Charlesworth et al., supra note 109; Andrew M. Deutz, Gender and International
Human Rights, 17 FLETCHER F. WoRaw AFr. 33 (1993).
242. Charlesworth et a., supra note 109, at 625. Within countries, a social dichotomy
exists between the public spheres of life which are usually dominated by men: the
legal, economic, political, employment and intellectual realms, and the private sphere
of life which is delegated to women: the home, children, and domestic life. The
government and legal system draw a distinction between these spheres in determining
the appropriateness of state interference; the state may regulate relations between men
in the public realm, but stays out of the private relations, particularly between men
and women. Similarly, the public/private distinction is carried over into international
law, so that relations between states are regulated, but anything that happens in the
"domestic sphere" has traditionally not been an appropriate area for international law.
Id See also Chinkin, supra note 2, at 350-51.
In the major human rights treaties, rights are defined according to what
men fear will happen to them, what harms they seek guarantees against.
The primacy traditionally given to civil and political rights is directed
toward protection for men within public and civil life, that is, their actions
with respect to government. This amounts to providing protection to men
against the actions of other men. The same importance has not been
generally accorded to economic and social rights which are often located
in the private sphere, the world of women.
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sovereign 'domestic jurisdiction.' 2 3 The legal basis for mandating such
a public/private dichotomy must be reanalyzed and may necessarily be
abolished if the goal of gender-neutral human rights for all is to be
attained. CEAFDAW brings into focus the consequences of this pub-
lic/private distinction, thereby compelling a reevaluation of this widely
observed practice which has contributed to the perpetuation of gender
discrimination in both international and domestic spheres of law.
Yet another reason for bifurcation is that
the preeminent trend in international human rights bodies and
among the private human rights NGOs has been to work on
ending violations against the physical integrity of the person
perpetrated by state actors-torture, extrajudicial killings,
disappearances. Comparatively little has been done regarding
enforcement of prohibitions on discrimination, and especially
little has been done on gender discrimination. Put simply, the
human rights organizations do not rank the problem very high
on a hierarchical list of human rights violations.
2 4
As most delegates to international human rights organizations and
members of NGOs are male, they may tend to overlook or fail to fully
appreciate the significance of issues mainly concerning women.
45 Civil
and political issues are of primary concern, often focusing on infractions
against male victims.24 6 Nonetheless, women's rights are human rights,
243. Gibson, supra note 40, at 42.
244. Heating 2, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Felice Gaer, Executive Director, Interna-
tional League for Human Rights). See also Marsha A. Freeman, "When Will 'Human'
Rights Expand to Include Women?" STR TRiBuNE, Feb. 18, 1990, at 35A ("For 40
years women have been invisible in international human-rights movements and
experiments in international governance. Indeed, for much longer than 40 years,
women have been invisible, except as presumably docile clients, in most global
enterprises, from economic development to population policy to political change.").
245. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 109, at 621-25.
246. See Freedman, supra note 244. See also Kim supra note 241, at 83. Kim paraphrases
Charlotte Bunch's summary of the excuses given by NGOs for not addressing gender-
based violations as follows:
1) sex discrimination is too trivial, or not as important, or will come after
larger issues of survival that require more serious attention; 2) the abuse of
women, while regrettable, is a cultural, private, or individual issue and not
a political matter requiring state action; 3) women's rights are not human
rights per se; or 4) the abuse of women is inevitable or so pervasive that




and should be addressed in mainstream human rights organizations as
such.247 One commentator predicts that in the near future a "period in
which issues of gender discrimination and violations of human rights
directed against women will emerge from the cloak of invisibility that has
been wrapped around them by mainstream human rights bodies."24
Finally, a fundamental structural reason for bifurcation is the
physical separation of CEDAW and the U.N. Commission on the Status
of Women, which are located in Vienna, from the other United Nations
human rights bodies and secretariat, which are located in Geneva. This
separation presents a distinct disadvantage, as CEDAW and the Com-
mission "are the only treaty bodies not serviced by the United Nations
Human Rights Center in Geneva."2 49 Their isolation prevents them from
working closely with the other human rights organs, and impairs their
ability to obtain current information on developments in international
human rights and to utilize the expertise of specialists within the other
U.N. human rights organs.
250
The problems with continued bifurcation of women's rights from
mainstream human rights within the U.N. structure, such as the treat-
ment of women's rights as secondary to other human rights and less
funding, staff, facilities and resources allocated to agencies addressing
women's rights, are valid concerns. Concerted action must be taken to
ensure that women's rights are effectively incorporated into the main-
stream instruments and system and that violations are treated as seriously
as other human rights violations.
Several suggestions for achieving such integration are made in the
following paragraphs. However, this author suggests that the problem of
violations of rights primarily affecting women optimally should be
addressed through a broad range of mechanisms. Such a broad-ranging
approach advocates both the use of mainstream mechanisms and in-
struments to address women's rights as an integral part of the whole
body of human rights, and the use of discrete instruments which enable
the focus of attention upon the specific problems of women due to
Paraphrased fom Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-
vision ofHuman Rights, in GENDER VioLENcE: A DEvELOPMENT AND HuMAN RIGHTS
ISSUE 3, 5 (1991).
247. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 42 (statement of Amnesty International USA).
248. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 26 (statement of Felice D. Gaer, Executive Director,
International League for Human Rights).
249. Donner, supra note 193, at 251.
250. See also Meron, supra note 221, at 215; Donner supra note 193, at 251.
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gender discrimination, such as CEAFDAW, CEDAW, and the Com-
mission on the Status of Women.
The Convention highlights those issues affecting women that have
been neglected for decades in other human rights instruments and
focuses international attention directly upon these issues in a manner that
simply melding them together with other human rights instruments
would not achieve. It ensures that States Parties act affirmatively to
redress the unequal status of women within their countries, that they will
be accountable to the international community for their action or
inaction, and that inaction concerning women's rights cannot be justified
with the excuse that other issues are more important or pressing and
need be addressed first. The Convention provides a comprehensive
instrument around which NGOs can organize their strategies to improve
the status of women both domestically and internationally. Finally, it
speaks to women resoundingly and unequivocally of their internationally
recognized rights to equality with men and full status as human beings.
Accordingly, the United Nations and its Member States must
actively seek to encourage the ratification of CEAFDAW by all nations
to ensure that the Convention becomes a truly universal standard of
nondiscrimination against women. It is now widely accepted that "[t]he
ratification of international human rights treaties is critical to the world-
wide observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United
Nations General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights have
repeatedly emphasized the importance of ratification and have frequently
encouraged states to ratify the relevant international instruments."251
With this in mind, the Commission on Human Rights formed a sub-
commission whose purpose is to develop means of encouraging ratifica-
tion of international human rights treaties. The United Nations should
utilize such a mechanism to promote the ratification of CEAFDAW and
should actively explore new methods by which Member States might be
encouraged to ratify.
In addition to utilizing CEAFDAW and other instruments and
agencies specifically addressing women's rights, improvements must be
made in the mainstream U.N. system to incorporate issues more specific
to women. One method of bringing women's issues into the mainstream
human rights arena is to focus the attention of other United Nations
bodies on violations against women's rights. Illustratively, the World
Health Organization (WHO) long ignored the issue of female circumci-
251. Weissbrodr, supra note 106, at 418.
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sion in eastern Africa, a process which causes the death of thousands of
young girls and the mutilation of hundreds upon thousands more every
year. 252 Finally, however, in 1987 WHO undertook a study of female
circumcision and its terrible health consequences, thereby drawing
international attention to this systematic mutilation of women and
girls.
253
More recently, the Commission on Human Rights adopted a
resolution directing the U.N. human rights agencies to integrate women's
rights into their work, suggesting the appointment of a special rapporteur
to investigate gender-based violence, requesting all other special
rapporteurs to include human rights violations against women in their
reports, and inviting states to include gender-disaggregated data in the
information they provide. 4 If all bodies of the United Nations become
resolved to consider gender discrimination a serious human rights
violation and to call for appropriate remedial action to be taken, other
mainstream human rights organizations, both official and private, will be
encouraged to address gender discrimination as well.255
252. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 148 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
253. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 148 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
254. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 154, 159. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
also recommended the integration of women's tights into the mainstream U.N.
human rights system.
To this end, it recommended increased cooperation among the [Commis-
sion on Human Rights], the Commission on the Status of Women, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the
U.N. Development Fund for Women and the U.N. Development
Programme, and improved coordination between the Center for Human
Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women. In addition to
these general directives, the conference called on the treaty-monitoring
bodies to disseminate information that women need to be able to use the
existing implementation procedures, and to incorporate gender-specific
information into their deliberations and findings. It encouraged training for
U.N. human rights and humanitarian relief personnel to "assist them to
recognize and deal with human rights abuses particular to women and to
carry out their work without gender bias," an implicit recognition of the
Organization's failure to meet these objectives in the past.
Id
255. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 149 (statement of Juliette Clagetr McLennan, U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women). For instance, in
1989, the Human Rights Commission formed a subcommittee and delegated a
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In addition, more women should be appointed as representatives
and professionals throughout the entire U.N. structure, and particularly
within those bodies drafting the international human rights instruments.
Upon the insistence of the Committee of Women's Organizations at the
1945 San Francisco Conference, Article 8 of the United Nations Charter
was included "to ensure the legitimacy of women as permanent staff
members of international organizations."256 However, currently "[i]ore
than two thirds of women at the U.N. are at the bottom of the organi-
zation's bureaucracy... in large part due to lack of support for change
coming from the member states-whose delegations and missions are
also male controlled."2 57 The appointment of more women to top level
positions within the United Nations would serve both to ensure that
women's issues are adequately represented and to demonstrate that
women are recognized as fully capable of working successfully within the
public sphere of life.
Another strategy for bringing women's rights to the forefront of the
international arena include grassroots education of women within
individual countries to heighten women's awareness both of their rights
and of the moral and legal prohibitions against the varied abuses sys-
tematically perpetuated against them. Women's organizations exist in
nearly every nation, and many provide information and educational
activities designed to raise the awareness of women in their respective
countries.25 The educational aspects of international human rights
conventions such as CEAFDAW are an important reason for ratification,
as they inform citizens of their rights to protection from human rights
violations and of the means to enforce those rights.259 Expanded interna-
tional networking of women's groups provides both increased domestic
credibility for these organizations and a greater awareness of the efforts
that women in other nations are making to improve their status and to
Special Rapporteur to investigate the health consequences of traditional practices such
as female circumcision on women and girls.
256. Charlesworth et al., supra note 109, at 622. Artide 8 reads: "The United Nations
shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any
capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs."
U.N. C ER, art. 8.
257. Gayle Kirshenbaum, Imide the WorM's Largest Men s Club, Ms., Sept./Oct. 1992, at
16.
258. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 106 (statement of the American Association of University
Women).
259. Cook, supra note 130, at 174.
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attain equal rights.26 Women's organizations help to create the political
will within nations to compel governments to address gender discrimina-
tion and to take active measures, both domestically and internationally,
to remediate such injustice.
261
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF RATIFICATION
BY THE UNITED STATES
A. Increased Credibility and Influence
of U.S. Foreign Policy
The United States should be leading the international fight against
gender discrimination, but unfortunately it remains one of the small
number of Members of the United Nations which have not yet ratified
CEAFDAW.262 All other nations in the Western Hemisphere have
ratified the Convention.263 This lack of ratification by the U.S. poses
problems for United States credibility and influence in international re-
lations and creates a sentiment that "Washington is guilty of hypoc-
risy"26" when it calls attention to the human rights violations of other
260. Hearing 2, supra note 2; at 72 (statement ofArvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch).
261. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 73 (statement ofArvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch). For example, women have formed an
international organization in Africa called the Inter-African Commission, to pressure
their countries to abolish the practice of female circumcision and other acts of
violence against women. Hearing2, supra note 2, at 149 (statement ofJuliette Clagett
McLennan, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
In addition, as religion is often used as an excuse to perpetuate abuse of women and
gender discrimination, individual scholars and women's organizations are undertaking
studies of religious doctrines in order to modernize and update traditional practices.
Most of these traditions did not originate in religious doctrine, but were combined
with religious precepts through outdated cultural practices of discrimination which
are no longer justifiable. See Hearing z, supra note 2, at 73 (statement of Felice D.
Gaer, Executive Director, International League for Human Rights).
262. Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Senator Paul Simon).
263. Letter from Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, to Senator Claiborne Pell, Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2 (Sept. 13, 1994).
264. Uli Schmetzer, China: Washington Guilty of Hypocriy on Human Rights, Cm. Thm.,
June 8, 1994, at 2. Schmetzer cited the lack of ratification of CEAFDAW by the
United States and ratification by China as one of several areas where China's human
rights record supersedes that of the United States. See also Hearing 3, supra note 5,
at 14 (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State).
Ms. Borek noted that
[n]ot ratifying the Convention hampers our ability to work specifically in
the area of women's rights, and also, more generally, in human rights.
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
nations. U.S. reticence to ratify CEAFDAW also jeopardizes its power to
influence future international developments and mechanisms concerning
the status and rights of women. For example, the United States was one
of the few nonratifying countries to attend the Fourth World Conference
on Women in September 1995 in Beijing, China. 65 Failure to ratify
CEAFDAW impacts the credibility afforded United States diplomats,
who frequently have difficulty representing the U.S. in international
forums because their country has proven so reluctant to support a major
international human rights convention. Ratification of the treaty could
provide U.S. "diplomatic negotiators a more solid, more formal, and
more visible backing when broaching this subject with their counterparts
in foreign capitals, at the United Nations, and in other international
settings.
" '66
The foreign service and State Department recently have begun to
focus greater attention on issues of gender discrimination and abuse. In
1989 the State Department added a section specifically concerning
violence against women in its annual Country Reports on Human
Rights. Paula Dobriansky of the State Department Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs notes that the Department is concerned
primarily with specific discriminatory actions directed against
women, whether committed or tolerated by governments,
including discriminatory legislation. Generally, these govern-
mental abuses may take two principal forms-physical abuse
and torture or denial of equal protection under the law, where-
We are often accused of being hypocritical, of having a double standard
because we do not join these conventions. Because we do not join them,
we cannot really invoke their provisions as an international norm because
it is too easy then to criticize us for not having joined them.
id.
265. Lois A. West, Improve the Lot of Women Worldwide, Mu HERAID, July 25, 1994,
at 13A. West comments that "[i]t is an embarrassment that such a powerful country
has yet to demonstrate its commitment to women in the international arena." See alo
Rat'y Women's Rights, CHISrAN Sci. MoNrroR, Oct. 3, 1994, at 18:
Ratifying the treaty will strengthen the position of the US as an interna-
tional champion of human rights. It will also place the US on an equal
footing with other nations at next year's UN Fourth World Conference on
Women, to be held in Beijing, signaling to the world that the US takes the
"moral imperative" of women's rights seriously.
266. Hearing z, supra note 1, at 40 (statement of Senator Rudy Boschwitz).
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by the state treats men and women differently solely because of
their respective gender. Both of these activities, in our view, are
impermissible.267
These actions taken by the United States to promote worldwide
equality for women are commendable and should be encouraged and
expanded. However, officials representing the United States in the
international arena who remonstrate against gender discrimination in
other countries appear hypocritical, because the U.S. continues to refuse
ratification of the most important and widely supported international
agreement addressing the rights of women. The U.S. Department of
State and its foreign officers would appear much more credible in their
expressions of concern for women's rights if the United States demon-
strated its unqualified support for the elimination of gender discrimina-
tion by becoming a member of CEAFDAW.
The concluding documents of the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Vienna/Helsinki agreements recom-
mended ratification of the Convention, and as a signatory, the United
States should uphold this commitment.268 As President Carter stated in
his message to the Senate, United States ratification of the Convention
"would make clear at home and abroad the commitment of the United
States to eliminate discrimination against women."269 Arvonne S. Fraser,
Co-Director of International Women's Rights Action Watch, testified to
Congress that U.S. ratification of the treaty "will be a strong signal that
this country does pay attention to the female half of its citizenry and to
the women of the world. 270
B. Opportunity to Influence the Development of International Human
Rights Law and to Designate a U.S. Nominee to CEDAW
Ratification of the Convention would give the United States an op-
portunity to nominate an expert to sit on CEDAW, the body
267. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 116 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
268. Hearingi, supra note 1, at 94 (statement of U.S. Representative John Edward Porter).
269. Message from the President, supra note 44.
270. Hearingr, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director, Interna-
tional Women's Rights Action Watch).
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monitoring State compliance with the Convention. Although the mem-
bers of the Committee are independent of their respective nations, nomi-
nating an expert to CEDAW would allow the U.S. to have some in-
fluence over the views represented on the Committee."' This is im-
portant if the United States desires to participate in shaping the inter-
national legal standards to which it may be held responsible in the
future, for it has been established that not only nations, but also inter-
national agencies established by international human rights instruments,
contribute to the development of international human rights law. 2
Professor John Gibson writes that treaty bodies established by human
rights conventions, such as CEDAW, "are legal authorities with consid-
erable autonomy which also generate progressive international human
rights law,"273 and that each "provides for its own procedural law, which
is essentially consistent among the treaty bodies but also illustrative of
the progressive nature of international human rights law."274 Participation
on the Committee is crucial for the United States to be able to influence
the development of both international legal principles pertaining to the
271. See Christopher, supra note 263. Secretary of State Christopher writes:
Ratification of the Convention at this time would serve both to underscore
our commitment to women's rights and to enhance our ability to protect
and promote those rights internationally.... In particular, participation
by the United States in the work of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, which oversees implementation of the
treaty by States Parties, would provide an opportunity for the United States
to play an even more active and effective role in the articulation and
advancement of the principles of non-discrimination and equality for
women around the world.
Id.
272. Gibson, supra note 40, at 51. See also Stewart, supra note 65, at 1183-84. Stewart
writes of the virtues of U.S. ratification in 1992 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which equally pertain to future U.S. ratification of CEAFDAW
Not only does U.S. adherence reflect and reinforce a long-standing national
commitment to those values, it will also enhance the U.S. role in protect-
ing and promoting the rule of law and democratic ideals internationally.
... [R]atification strengthens the ability of the United States to influence
the development of appropriate human rights principles in the international
community and provides an additional and effective tool for efforts to
improve respect for fundamental freedoms in many problem countries.
Id
273. Gibson, supra note 40, at 51.
274. Gibson, supra note 40, at 52.
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rights of women and procedures to review the actions of States Parties
for the effective implementation of CEAFDAW.
2 7 5
U.S. ratification of the Convention would also allow the United
States to assist in improving the effectiveness of CEAFDAW. For
example, the United States might urge the expansion of time during
which CEDAW annually convenes, lobby for a more adequate and
effective secretariat and other resources for CEDAW, encourage the
appointment of special rapporteurs to investigate violations of specific
Convention provisions, push for the addition of an optional protocol to
allow CEDAW to consider individual complaints and communications
against States Parties that have agreed to it, and improve coordination
between CEDAW and other U.N. human rights bodies.
C Recognition of Women's Rights as Human Rights and the Need for
Greater International Promotion of Women's Equality
United States ratification and support of CEAFDAW would be a
powerful step toward the universal recognition of women's rights as
human rights and would provide increased momentum to the interna-
tional movement for women's equality.2 76 Aside from the limited pro-
gressive measures noted in this article, women's rights have historically
been neglected in international human rights discussions, documents, and
implementation mechanisms, both in the United States and around the
world.2"
275. Hearings, supra note 1, at 105 (statement of Amnesty International USA).
276. U.S. ratification of CEAFDAW and the other international human rights coniventions
would also greatly contribute to the achievement of universal human rights principles
and international human rights law. Gibson notes that "the United States' non-
ratification of most of the covenants is a major drawback in the global enhancement
of [international human rights] law." Gibson, supra note 40, at 58.
277. Rhoodie, supra note 2, at ix. Up until the 1970s, women's issues were not discussed
outside of the Commission on the Status of Women and the Economic and Social
Committee. Linda Hossie, Groups Pressure U.N. on Women's Rights, PLAN DEALER,
Nov. 26, 1992, at 7G. This neglect of women's rights as human rights persists.
Hossie notes that hundreds of women's organizations mobilized to correct what they
saw as "a glaring omission by organizers" of the U.N. conference on human rights
in 1992. See also Freeman, supra note 244; Beverley Earle & Gerald Madek, An
InternationalPerspective on SexualHarassment Law, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 43, 71 (1993)
("The United Nations, though a leader in many areas, has never been a leader in
women's rights. Concerns over international boundaries, war, and peace have
consumed the young organization and left to the periphery concerns of women.").
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This failure to take into account women's perspectives still persists
in current negotiation, formulation, and interpretation of mainstream
international human rights law.' U.S. Representative Gus Yatron has
testified that, although human rights concerns have been institutionalized
as an important component of U.S. foreign policy,
U.S. policy-makers and non-governmental human rights orga-
nizations focus most of their efforts on regimes which use
repression as an instrument to maintain total control of the
countries they govern. Our efforts, however, have fallen short
on concentrating much needed attention on the extent to
which governments have institutionalized repression against
women.
279
CEAFDAW helps to address that deficiency, highlights the pervasive
worldwide discrimination against women and its deleterious effects, and
provides a first step toward eradicating gender discrimination and its
effects. The United States should, therefore, ratify and actively support
CEAFDAW, thereby embracing the redress of wrongs specific to women,
as well as gaining a forum from which to raise issues concerning women
in mainstream international human rights organizations.
U.S. ratification of CEAFDAW would also provide a powerful force
behind the international movement to improve the status of women. The
United Nations General Assembly has recognized the importance of
widespread ratification of international human rights documents to
ensure that human rights are observed and respected:
It is of paramount importance for the promotion of human
rights and fundamental freedoms that member States undertake
specific obligations through accession to or ratification of
international instruments in this field; consequently the stan-
dard setting work within the United Nations system in the
field of human rights and the universal acceptance and imple-
mentation of the relevant international instruments should be
encouraged. 80
278. See Cook, supra note 95, at 672.
279. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 1 (statement of U.S. Representative Gus Yatron).
280. GA. Res. 32/130, 32 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 45 at 150, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977)
cited in Weissbrodt, supra note 106, at 419.
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United States ratification of CEAFDAW would lend weight to the
acceptance of the prohibition of gender discrimination as an international
legal norm, contributing to the development of international law in this
area.
28 1
D. Continuity of U.S. Support for the International Equality of Women
The United States should ratify CEAFDAW in order to demon-
strate its continued and unqualified support for improving the status and
equality of women throughout the world.282 Such support would be
consistent with previous U.S. efforts in the international political arena
to promote women's rights and end discrimination against women. As
noted above, the United States signed and ratified the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women nearly two decades ago.283 The United
States has successfully introduced several important initiatives in the
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. The U.S. was
active in drafting CEAFDAW, and voted for its adoption in the U.N.
General Assembly in 1979.24 By the end of 1989, forty-three percent of
the American professionals in the Secretariat of the United Nations were
female.
285
The United States has worked to promote "the systematic inte-
gration of women's issues into UN programs, the training of UN per-
sonnel to ensure sensitivity and competence in addressing gender-based
abuses, and the appointment of more women to positions of respon-
sibility in the UN ."2 6 The U.S. Agency for International Development
281. Zearfoss, supra note 81, at 942 n.199.
282. See, e.g., -Earle & Madek, supra note 277, at 90. These authors state that U.S.
ratification of CEAFDAW would be "an important symbolic step" in providing
leadership on the issue of sexual harassment at the international level. Id See also
Hearing 3, supra note 5, at 64-65 (statement of Bernard Hamilton, Director,
Minority Rights Group). Mr. Bernard states that "[t]he United States must ratify the
Women's Convention in order to play an effective role in the international protection
of women's rights and to maintain its moral and political authority on these issues
in the international community." Id
283. See Stewart, supra note 65, 1184 n.4 (citing Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, opened fr signature Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force
for the United States July 7, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1909)).
284. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 76 (statement of International Women's Rights Action
Watch).
285. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Jackie Wolcott, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, International Social and Humanitarian Affairs, Bureau of International
Organization Affairs).
286. Christopher, supra note 263.
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(USAID) gives assistance to developing nations for programs to promote
women's rights in development.287 The United States also promotes
women's organizations and advances women's rights throughout the
world by funding various programs, such as literacy and health care
projects and programs to assist refugee women. 288 The annual reports of
the State Department on the human rights situations in countries around
the world contain a section devoted particularly to gender discrimination,
from which a publication has arisen entitled Human RightsAbusesAgainst
Women: A Work/wide Survey.289 The ratification of CEAFDAW would
be a clear demonstration of the United States' continued support of the
international rights and equality of women.
E. The Inspiration of Other Progressive U.S. Measures
United States ratification of CEAFDAW would inspire further
action within the U.S. for the promotion of women's equality both
domestically and abroad, and the U.S. government could take measures
in light of the Convention to lend support to the international move-
ment for women's rights. For example, Congress and the administration
would be encouraged to reform legislation in order to come into com-
pliance with CEAFDAW provisions. The United States would then be
able to remove reservations or restrictive interpretations of those provi-
sions.29 Other States Parties have reformed their domestic laws to come
into compliance with the Convention, and the U.S. should not be seen
to do less.291 United States ratification of CEAFDAW would also provide
287. Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 48 (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
288. Christopher, supra note 263.
289. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 75 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Director, Inter-
national Women's Rights Action Watch).
290. Some commentators have suggested that implementing legislation be submitted to the
Senate simultaneously with human rights treaties, in order to prevent delay in passing
implementing legislation, and to permit the U.S. to make as few reservations,
understandings and declarations to the treaties as possible. See, e.g., Stewart, supra
note 65, at 1206-7. These are unquestionably desirable goals; however, under the
current system of ratification with reservations, such a step could prolong debate and
delay ratification of human rights treaties to an even greater extent than enactment
of implementing legislation.
291. For example, Japan passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1985 in part
to bring its laws in line with the Convention. Michael S. Bennett, Gender-Based
Employment Discrimination in Japan and the United States, 15 Loy. LA. hr'L &
Comp. L.J. 149, 160 n.69 (1992). Finland also drafted a new law providing for
gender equality after it ratified the Convention:
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assurance that domestic laws prohibiting sex discrimination could not
deteriorate in contravention of the Convention.292 The U.S. could also
establish a domestic agency which, in cooperation with various NGOs,
would monitor human rights violations in the U.S. under CEAFDAW
and other human rights treaties, review progress toward remedying
specific problems, and prepare requisite periodic reports to CEDAW and
the other human rights committees.
2 93
As another example of the potential influence of CEAFDAW, the
State Department has recognized the need to heighten public awareness
of abuses against women and the concomitant need for information
documenting these abuses,294 and could utilize the Convention as a
vehicle to achieve these goals. As one such measure, the section on
gender discrimination of the annual U.S. Department of State human
rights reports could be based on the Convention, in order to encourage
the Convention's implementation in other countries and its recognition
as an international standard.29' The U.S. Foreign Service Institute, which
gives a course on human rights to foreign service officers, might expand
the course to provide more focus on issues concerning human rights
abuses specifically against women, using the Convention as a standard. 96
Furthermore, the United States could provide greater assistance to
foreign governments in terms of addressing domestic institutional
reforms, implementing more effective means of enforcing domestic law,
and studying the domestic legal system to reevaluate which features
promote or inhibit gender equality.297 The U.S. could also enact trade
Thanks to the Convention there was pressure on the Government from
two sides: the Finnish people, organizations and groups and the National
Equality Council from inside, and UN expectations from outside. Finnish
pressure groups did not hesitate to argue that the international image of
the Finnish Government would be tarnished if the necessary changes in the
law were not enacted and the Convention ratified soon...
Pietili & Vickers, supra note 38, at 128.
292. Zearfoss, supra note 81, at 941.
293. See, e.g., Ginger, supra note 83, 1388-89. Both Norway and Italy have established
similar agencies.
294. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 147 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
295. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 17-18 (statement of Arvonne S. Fraser, Co-Director,
International Women's Rights Watch).
296. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 116 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
297. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 147 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs).
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boycotts and economic sanctions and withhold financial assistance and
other types of aid, in protest of egregious human rights violations against
women, just as it has done in protest of other human rights violations.298
Finally, the United States can continue to promote women's rights by
promoting the growth of democracy around the world.2 99 The ratification
of CEAFDAW would provide a model for United States action in these
and other areas in which it confronts gender discrimination.
. Grassroots Support for Ratification
The United States government should recognize the widespread
support of its citizens for ratification of CEAFDAW. There is broad-
based support for U.S. ratification from civic, religious, legal, human
rights, and women's organizations." 0 Associations such as B'nai B'rith
298. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 147 (statement of Senator Jan Meyers). See Elizabeth E
Defeis, Equity and Equality fir Women-Ratification of International Covenants as a
First Step, 3 SaTON HA CONST. L.J. 363, 407 (1993). The Clinton Administration
stated during the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights that "it intends to
incorporate compliance with protection of all human rights in defining trade and
foreign aid relationships."
299. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 118 (statement of Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs). This commentator states that the U.S. should continue
to foster the development of full-fledged democracies, with a system of
'checks and balances' to protect the civil and political rights of citizens. In
such countries, in addition to the structural limitations on governmental
power, impartial and independent judiciaries provide another safeguard of
individual liberties and stand ready to strike down abuses of governmental
authority, whether they be of an executive or legislative variety. This
democratic institution-building and the "rule of law" is one of our best
hopes for guaranteeing the rights of everybody-women, men and children.
See generally Jon Ebersole, National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging
Norm ofDemocracy in International Law, 86 AM. Soc' Ikrr'L L. 249 (1992); Thomas
M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 46
(1992).
300. Such organizations include: American Association of Retired Persons; American
Association of University Women; American Baptist Churches; American Bar
Association; Americans for Democratic Action; American Federation of Teachers;
American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; American Medical Women's
Association; American Nurses Association; American Psychiatric Association;
American Society for International Law; American Veterans Committee; Amit
Women; Amnesty International; Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; Association
for Women in Psychology, Association for Women in Science; Black Women's
Agenda; B'nai B'rith International; B'nai B'rith Women; Center for Policy Alterna-
tives (Women's Economic Justice Center); Church Women United; Committee for
International Human Rights Inquiry- Episcopal Church, USA; Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America; Emunah Women; Federally Employed Women; Grey Panthers;
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Women have established widespread educational and promotional
campaigns to encourage public support for U.S. ratification of the Con-
vention. A conference on the status of women which convened in Iowa
in 1990 attracted over 800 participants, demonstrating widespread rec-
ognition of the need to address gender discrimination in the United
States." 1 The American Bar Association (ABA) has also given strong sup-
port to U.S. ratification of the Convention. The House of Delegates of
the ABA adopted a resolution in 1984 to this effect, and has undertaken
Hadassah; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights; Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights; League of Women Voters; Na'amat USA; National Assembly of Religious
Women; National Association of Commissions for Women; National Association of
Social Workers; National Association of Women Judges; National Association of
Women Lawyers; National Black Women's Health Project; National Board of the
YWCA of the USA; National Coalition of 100 Black Women; National Conference
of Christians and Jews, Inc.; National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA;
National Council of Jewish Women; National Education Association; National
Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs; National Federation of
Temple Sisterhoods; National Hook-up of Black Women, Inc.; National Ladies
Auxiliary, Jewish War Veterans; National Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council; National Lawyers Guild; National Organization for Women (NOW); NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund; National Spiritual Assembly of Baha'i of the
United States; National Women's Conference Committee; National Women's
Political Caucus; National Women's Studies Association; Organization of Pan-Asian
American Women; Planned Parenthood Federation of America; Society for the
Advancement of Women's Health Research; Soroptimist International; St. Joan's
Alliance; United Presbyterian Church; United Presbyterian Church, USA; Unitarian
Universalist Service Committee; Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations;
United Church Board for World Ministries; United Methodist Church; United
Nations Association of the United States; United States Conference of Mayors; Wider
Opportunities for Women, The Women Activist Fund, Inc.; Women for Internation-
al Peace and Arbitration; Women's Action Alliance, Inc.; Women's Alliance for
Theology, Ethics, and Ritual; Women's American ORT; Women's Branch, Union
of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America; Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom; Women's International Public Health Network; Women's
League for Conservative Judaism; Women's Legal Defense Fund; Womens Action for
New Directions; World Federalist Association; Young Women's Christian Associa-
tion; and Zonta International. List compiled from Hearing i, supra note 1, at 67
(statement by Horowitz, Harriet J., President, B'nai B'rith Women); Hearing.2, supra
note 2, at 193 (Appendix 5, statement entitled Written Testimony); NATIONAL
COMMITEE ON U.N./CEDAW, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
EUrMNTION oF ALL FoRMs OF DIScvrIINATION AGAINsr WOMEN FAcr SHEET, Jan.
1995; and B'NA B'RITH WOMEN, CONrrION ON THE EumINATION OF ALL FoRms
OF DISCRIMMnATION AGAINST WOMEN.
301. Hearing x, supra note 1, at 65 (statement of Harriet J. Horowitz, President, B'nai
B'rith Women).
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extensive studies which conclude that no significant legal impediments
exist which would bar U.S. ratification.
302
CONCLUSION
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women "is the first international human rights convention that
specifically focuses on the rights of women as human rights. This aspect
of human rights has been missing from the human rights agenda."
30 3
CEAFDAW provides much needed international support for the growing
movement for women's rights around the world. Concededly, several
issues remain to be resolved concerning U.S. ratification of CEAFDAW,
its international implementation, and its significance within the U.N.
structure as a whole. Some difficulties are to be expected with an inter-
national human rights convention that aspires to universality and at the
same time seeks to transform society to eliminate the inequitable envi-
ronment that presently persists for half of the population. As noted in
this article, such shortcomings with the Convention, its implementation,
and the U.N. system can be remedied and should not be permitted to
stand as excuses for nonratification of the Convention.
The United States could lend its weight to CEAFDAW through
ratification and by significant and substantive efforts to implement the
treaty. Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women, testified that
an international body such as the United Nations is not an
implementing body. The only way that we and other member
states can see progress made through a U.N. body is for each
one of us to take a consensus resolution and make sure that it
is translated into action in each of our countries.
30 4
The United States must provide international leadership in the move-
ment for women's equality through ratification of CEAFDAW and
ensuring its effective implementation within the United States. Greater
pressure from the United States for global implementation of
CEAFDAW would also have significant effects for women's rights
302. Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 68 (statement of Catherine E. Bocskor, Vice Chair,
Section on International Law and Practice, American Bar Association).
303. Hearing 1, supra note 1, at 107 (statement of American Association of University
Women).
304. Hearing 2, supra note 2, at 146 (statement of Juliette Clagett McLennan, U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women).
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internationally. The United States should ratify the Convention in order
to help improve the status of women throughout the world, to ensure
that the U.S. is included in the process of developing emerging interna-
tional human rights legal principles, and to maintain the credibility of
U.S. foreign policy when addressing human rights issues in the interna-
tional arena. At the present time, equality between women and men is
still but a distant vision. However, through the persistent efforts of
concerned people around the world working in concert to improve the
lot of women, the dream of gender equality shall indeed one day be
realized. t

